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Abstract 
WHO IS BETTER AT IDENTIFYING AT-RISK BEHAVIOR? LEADER VERSUS EMPLOYEE 
PROCESSES TO IMPLEMENT TASK-SPECIFIC BEHAVIORAL PINPOINTS 
 
Matthew M. Laske 
B.S., Western Michigan University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
Chairperson: Timothy D. Ludwig 
 
Reducing workplace injuries through preventative measures requires the 
identification of risks so that interventions can be designed to reduce the prevalence of 
behaviors that may result in injury. Behavioral safety processes have been adopted by 
numerous companies to achieve this goal. A multiple-baseline design was used to examine 
the effects of implementing a task-specific checklist on the identification of risk in an 
existing behavioral safety program at a Fortune-500 chemical manufacturer. The pinpointing 
of task behaviors was performed either by managers or employee focus groups to see the 
impact on risk identification. The employee pinpointing process resulted in more behavioral 
pinpoints, whereas the manager driven process included more conditions, knowledge and 
awareness questions. The employee driven process demonstrated the greatest increases in 
risk identified when the task-specific checklist was put into use by the workforce. The 
management pinpointing process was associated with minimal increases in risks identified. 
The employee driven process also resulted in the creation of the most preventative safety 
action items than their manager counterparts. Overall, the study found preliminary evidence 
v 
that employee driven pinpoints are more likely to conform to behavioral criteria, identify 
more risk, and lead to more safety action items when compared to manager processes. 
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Who is Better at Identifying At-Risk Behavior?  
Leader Versus Employee Processes to Implement Task-Specific Behavioral Pinpoints 
There are approximately 2.8 million annual injuries and illnesses within the United States 
private work sector resulting in 882,730 days away from work (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 
2018a) and over 5,000 fatalities (BLS, 2018b). Because the number of injuries and fatalities 
remain high, intervening to prevent workplace incidents is of social importance. 
Workplace incidents can also be costly for organizations. In 2017, the estimated cost of 
workplace injuries were $165.5 billion, which included wage and productivity costs, medical and 
administrative expenses, and damages (National Safety Council, 2019). On average, a medically 
consulted injury costs companies $39,000 and a fatality costs $1.15 million (National Safety 
Council, 2019). Injuries can also result in employees spending time away from work, often 
referred to as days lost. In 2017, total days lost were estimated at 104 trillion days, 67 percent of 
which occurred due to injuries in 2017, and 33 percent were the result of injuries from previous 
years (National Safety Council, 2019). These statistics illustrate that organizations have both a 
moral and business interest in investing in efforts to improve their workplace safety. 
Traditional safety practices are often driven predominantly by antecedent tactics and 
involve rules, policies, signs, and training programs to increase knowledge and awareness. 
Consequence tactics such as incentives are also common and can include programs with group 
and individual rewards for obtaining a goal of zero incidents for a set period. Although well-
intended, these incentives can result in underreporting of risk and injuries (Pransky, Snyder, 
Dembe, & Himmelstein, 1999). Punishment is often used to discourage unsafe actions. Similar to 
incentives, this often results in decreases of reporting, especially when the punishment can result 
in termination, such as in a three strike system (Guo, Goh, & Le Xin Wong, 2018).  
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Despite these limitations, safety management systems have contributed to the reduction 
of workplace incidents. Injuries have been trending downward since 1992, with an injury rate of 
8.9 per 100-full time employees, compared to 2.6 in 2017 (BLS, 2018a). Although injuries and 
illnesses rates have decreased significantly over the last 25 years, the number of fatalities have 
remained more or less constant, with 6,217 in 1992 and 5,147 in 2017 (BLS, 2018b; see Figure 
1). Due to this stagnation in the number of fatalities, safety experts (McSween & Moran, 2017) 
have asserted the need for processes designed specifically to reduce these serious injuries and 
fatalities (SIFs). 
Behavioral Safety 
An empirically demonstrated method for reducing workplace incidents is the application 
of behavior analytic principles to safety (i.e., behavioral safety; Grindle, Dickinson, & Boettcher, 
2000; Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). behavioral safety is a process of (a) identifying behaviors 
most critical to safety, (b) behaviorally defining those measures for precision and reliability, (c) 
observing critical behaviors, (d) providing feedback on safe behavior after observation, and (e) 
reinforcing progress towards goals.  
A meta-analytic review of behavioral safety found that 32 of the 33 reviewed studies 
demonstrated a reduction in injuries (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). Another review 
demonstrated decreases in incident rates across fifteen behavioral safety programs accredited by 
an objective team of expert reviewers (Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies [CCBS], 2020). 
A recent application of behavioral safety (Myers, McSween, Medina, Rost, & Alvero, 2010) 
demonstrated an 81% decrease in recordable incidents and 79% decrease in lost-time incidents 
over a 20 year span.  
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Although behavioral safety is a well-established process with over 40 years of successful 
implementation, it too has failed, along with many other safety initiates, to impact serious 
injuries and fatalities at a necessary level. McSween & Moran (2017) suggested that for 
behavioral safety to contribute to the reduction of serious injuries and fatalities (SIFs) it must (a) 
identify high-risk tasks, (b) clearly define the behaviors within those specific tasks, and (c) 
identify the behavior and environmental precursors around the high-risk task for intervention 
design. The assertions made by McSween and Moran (2017) indicate that if higher-risk tasks are 
targeted for behavioral observation, greater identification of risk can be achieved in activities that 
could result in SIFs.  
Wirth and Sigurdsson proposed a similar recommendation calling for further study in the 
application of behavioral safety to reduce SIFs asking “are general classes of behavior 
appropriate targets for intervention?” Their call for research centered around whether behavioral 
observation checklists should pinpoint task-specific or general response classes of behavior. 
(Wirth & Sigurdsson, 2008, p. 592). These discussions emphasize the need to differentiate 
between general checklists that list response classes of behavior (e.g., body position, 
housekeeping, and PPE) versus task-specific behavior that is much more pinpointed to 
movements (e.g., “cut away from body with your thumb on the back of the blade”). The research 
question is if task-specific behavioral checklists go further than general behavioral checklists in 
the identification of higher risk targets that reduce the potential for SIFs. 
General versus Specific Observation Checklists 
Researchers have used a variety of different behavioral pinpoints in published studies. In 
the two original behavioral safety publications, Komaki, Barwick, and Scott (1978) used task-
specific pinpointed behaviors (e.g., “when lifting or lowering dough trough, hand holds and at no 
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time loses contact with dump chain”) whereas Sulzer-Azaroff & De Santamaria (1980) used 
general conditions that were as a result of behavior for a checklist (e.g., “obstruction of exits”, 
“hazardous material storage”). Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff (1984) utilized a combination of 
general (e.g., “hardhats are to be worn while in the yard”) and task-specific pinpoints (e.g., 
“hoists are used when lifting a roll of paper onto the machine; the sling of the hoist should be 
wrapped around the roll”). A further example of these differences in critical pinpoints can also be 
found in a study by Lebbon, Sigurdsson, & Austin (2012), who demonstrated differences in 
critical pinpoints by targeting a general condition of trip hazards with a general description of 
“no congested walkways” and more specific task behaviors around potential burn incidents. The 
latter pinpoints included specific descriptions around cooking tasks such as “stands back when 
opening combi-ovens” and “rotary oven: OFF” (Lebbon et al., 2012).  
Although 40 years of behavioral safety applications have consistently been associated 
with increases in safe behaviors and the reduction in injuries (Cooper, 2009; Krause, Seymour, & 
Sloat, 1999), no interpretations were provided regarding the relative effectiveness of general or 
specific pinpoints. Killimett (1991) described situations in which a general behavior pinpoint 
should be used versus a specific behavioral pinpoint. Generic behavioral pinpoints are not 
specific to any job and include targets such as equipment condition and personal protective 
equipment (PPE) use (Killimett, 1991), whereas critical behavioral pinpoints are job specific and 
should include tasks that are likely more hazardous. Killimett (1991) illustrates this difference 
with an example of an employee lighting a furnace. Behaviors within this task are more crucial 
because the hazard associated with it is more dangerous (i.e. potential fatality).  
If the observation is based on general pinpoints, the resulting data and feedback to 
employees may not be representative of tasks performed. In the example of Lebbon et al., 
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(2012), trip hazards were a condition resulting from worker behavior. If workers receive 
feedback on this unsafe condition, but their behavior didn’t cause the condition, avoidance 
behaviors may be reinforced whereas volunteering in the observation process may be punished.  
Another common difference between general and specific checklists is the rotation of 
checklist items. Programs using specific checklists tend to rotate items as interventions and 
feedback raise safety performance of behaviors above criteria. These behaviors are replaced by 
new pinpoints (Cooper, 2006). The rotation of pinpoints allows for revaluation of critical 
behaviors that have been mastered by the workers for replacement with pinpoints that may still 
be at-risk (CCBS, 2017). In contrast, pinpoints on a general checklist typically remain 
indefinitely regardless of safety performance, work design changes, or technological changes. 
This is due to the general categories where some specific safe behaviors may be mastered within 
the response class (e.g., shoveling with a wide foot stance within body position) whereas other 
behaviors within the same response class may still be at-risk (e.g., bending at waist while 
shoveling). 
Behavioral Pinpoint Criteria for Task-Specific Checklists  
Just giving more detail on a task-specific checklist does not lead to a more discriminate 
behavioral pinpoint. Behavioral pinpoints must provide detail about the behaviors involved in 
tasks instead of just providing more detail around the product of behavior (e.g., work conditions 
clean, using proper tool, wearing PPE, completed permit). A more task-specific item may state 
“safe lifting technique used while moving oil drums.” Although this is more specific to the task, 
there is not enough information on the topography of the behavior to evaluate what “safe lifting 
technique” means. A pinpoint similar to this is too ambiguous and may not orient the observer to 
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the behavior needed to be observed. Therefore, criteria for specific pinpoints need to be 
developed and tested. 
Johnston and Pennypacker (1980) adopted Skinner’s definition of behavior to:  
The behavior of an organism is that portion of the organism’s interaction 
with its environment that is characterized by detectable displacement in 
space through time of some part of the organism and that results in a 
measurable change in at least one aspect of the environment. (p. 48) 
Johnston and Pennypackers’ (1980) definition of behavior was expanded to adopt seven-pinpoint 
criteria. The pinpoint should indicate (a) the bodily (or verbal) action that should happen, (b) the 
physical thing in the environment the behavior is impacting, (c) when the behavior should occur, 
(d) what the behavior will achieve. Furthermore, the pinpoint must be (e) observable and 
measurable, (f) under the employee’s control, and (g) passes the dead-person test. 
Bodily or verbal action that should happen. Johnston and Pennypackers’ (1980) 
definition of behavior focuses on movement of the organism and excludes states. Defining 
behavior as physical movements of the body (both physical and verbal) has been discussed 
elsewhere (Mayer, Sulzer-Azaroff, & Wallace, 2019; Miller, 2006; White, 1971). Mayer et al. 
(2019) further describe what is meant by excluding states, “Behavior implies action. So labels, 
states, or personal characteristics like happy, sad, and alert are not included” (p.22).  
Physical thing in the environment the behavior is impacting. Johnston and 
Pennypackers’ (1980) definition of behavior also included the interaction the behavior has on the 
environment. The authors elaborate on this stating, “Behavior cannot occur in an environmental 
void, nor can it occur in the absence of living tissue. Furthermore, it happens only when an 
interactive condition exists as a result of some relational state” (Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980, 
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p. 49). Behavior must not only be an active physical movement but it must also result in some 
change in the environment.  
When the behavior should occur. Mayer, Sulzer-Azaroff, and Wallace (2019) describe 
pinpoints as requiring behavioral objectives. A critical aspect of the objective is the context of the 
behavior. Context can be defined as, “conditions under which the desired response is to occur” 
(Mayer et al., 2019, p. 75). Kazdin (1994) described context as the antecedent stimuli that 
specifies the conditions in which the behavior is to occur. In behavioral safety, context is 
important as it specifies under what conditions a specific behavior is required for a safe outcome. 
For example, an electrician must place their hands in a fuse box to complete work. If the 
electrician places their hands in the fuse box prior to turning off the power it could result in an 
electrical shock. Therefore, specifying that the electrician should work in the fuse box after the 
power has been turned off will result in a safe outcome.  
What the behavior will achieve. A behavioral pinpoint should also include what the 
behavior achieves in the process (i.e., the behaviors function). Mayer et al. (2019) also 
recommend that behavioral research should focus on, “actions (both physical and verbal), and 
the functions of those actions” (p. 22). Miller (2006) also includes what the behavior achieves or 
avoids in the definition of behavior, stating, “Behavior is physical, and it functions to do 
something” (p.15). In behavioral safety, a pinpoint should describe the consequences of the 
behavior regarding what it achieves or avoids. An example would be, “put on gloves prior to 
touching equipment to avoid excessive heat.” This pinpoint describes what the behavior would 
function to achieve (avoiding the heat). Another example to demonstrate a pinpoint achieving an 
outcome is, “grab a stepladder to reach equipment.”  
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Observable and measurable. The essential requirement of behavioral pinpoint in 
behavioral safety is that in can be observed and measured (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000; 
Sulzer-Azaroff & Fellner, 1984). Chance (2006) includes observation and measurement in his 
definition of behavior, “Behavior may be defined as anything an organism does that can be 
measured” (p. 37). Other authors have included observation requirements as a test of whether the 
behavior is a physical movement, “The best test of whether it is physical is whether you can 
observe it” (Miller, 2006, p. 15). In stating the behavior must be detectable so it can be 
measured, Johnston and Pennypacker (1980) explain that it “means perceivable; if it happens, 
that is ultimately knowable by an observer” (p. 50).   
Under the employee’s control. Pinpointing behaviors and conditions that are within the 
employees have been emphasized since the earliest applications in behavioral safety (Sulzer-
Azaroff & Fellner, 1984). By pinpointing behaviors in the employees control it allows for 
appropriate delivery of consequences for employee behavior (Daniels & Bailey, 2014).  
Passes the dead-person test. Lindsley (1991) proposed that to ease the use of behavioral 
principles for practitioners (i.e., parents, teachers, etc.) behavior analysts should have plain 
English translations. An applicable test to determine if a measure is behavioral is the dead-person 
test (Lindsley, 1991). The test simply asks, “If a dead man can do it, it isn’t behavior and 
shouldn’t be taught” (Lindsley, 1991, p. 457). The dead-person test assists novice practitioners 
with determining if a pinpoint contains movement of the body and is observable.  
The goal of the present study was to determine the pinpointing process more likely to 
produce checklist items targeting behaviors as defined by the definition of behavior (Johnston & 
Pennypacker, 1980) and the expanded seven-pinpoint criteria. We believe that accurate 
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behavioral pinpoints will result higher risk identification when workers use the checklist during 
observations done within their behavioral safety program. 
At-Risk Identification 
A goal in behavioral safety is to identify risk when and where it is happening in the 
workplace. Employee behaviors can put them at risk. Therefore, finding these behavioral risks 
allows for efficacious interventions to be implemented to prevent injury. Indeed, the use of 
general versus specific pinpoints may impact the quality of the behavioral safety process itself.  
General checklists could create ambiguity in the observation process. A general pinpoint 
such as “Hands free from pinch points” might result in differing opinions from the observer and 
the worker over what constitutes a correct demonstration of this behavior. This could result in the 
observation being marked as safe opposed to at-risk to avoid potential confrontation with the 
worker who might disagree. This negative reinforcement could result in the observer marking 
items as safe more often (Matey, Gravina, Rajagopal, & Betz, 2019). These issues of 
interpretation may detract from the effectiveness of feedback and eventually harm a behavioral 
safety process as participation is punished and “all safe” responses on checklists are negatively 
reinforced.   
General pinpoints also may result in low identification of risk because ambiguous 
pinpoints can easily be interpreted as safe because of their lack of operational definition. For 
example, the general pinpoint “hazard/pinch point,” can make ratings difficult when workers are 
asked to differentiate between a safe and at-risk response. A general pinpoint is not a sufficient 
antecedent to evoke any particular identification of risk as it does not identify the temporal 
moment of when a behavior becomes at risk of a pinch point. A specific behavioral pinpoint can 
identify the temporal moment the behavior may put workers at-risk (e.g., “while loosening bolts 
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on equipment, start from the back side to avoid unintended movement of equipment”). Because 
this pinpoint specifies the temporal moments and topography of the behavior it is more likely 
function as a discriminative stimulus for the observer watching this particular risk.   
For example, falling objects could potentially harm an employee stationed below, so a 
worker being able to identify the specific at-risk behavior becomes crucial to intervening. A 
general checklist may use items such as “free from line of fire” as a pinpoint during the 
observation. An employee conducting the observation may score these items as safe during the 
observation due to the vagueness of the risk they are trying to identify. For line of fire, where 
exactly is the employee at risk of falling objects? What’s the safe alternative? A specific checklist 
designed around the behavioral criterion would identify more pinpointed behavior to keep the 
worker safe during the specific high-risk task. Example of pinpoints are “look up to verify no 
work being done above” and “put out barriers when work is performed above the area.” The 
resulting observation would allow an employee to better discriminate between at-risk and safe 
behavior in the high-hazard task as well as provide more useful feedback to their co-worker. 
When at-risk behaviors are identified successfully, we are more likely to see the variance 
in performance that are likely to result in injury. Sometimes this variance is latent and can be 
missed using general checklists. Shortcuts, for example, result when an employee engages in 
behavior that make a process quicker or less strenuous and can often put an employee at risk. 
These deviations are naturally reinforced by the reduction in effort needed to complete a task.  
An employee could take a shortcut by using an improvised tool instead of the engineered tool. If 
the improvised tool requires less effort, using it will be reinforced.  
When deviation in work processes occur, targeted behavioral observations should identify 
this variance and provide critical information for the analysis and mitigation of contingencies 
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influencing risky behavior. A general checklist may not capture this deviance whereas a specific 
checklist pinpointing “employee uses engineered tool while cleaning machine” would. The data 
around the employees’ deviation from the engineered tool would provide behavioral information 
helpful in the analysis of contingencies controlling the employees use of the improvised tool. 
The resulting contingency analysis may indicate that the improvised tool was longer in size than 
the engineered tool allowing for more leverage.  
Contingency analysis that lead to effective intervention design, therefore, are reliant on 
the identification of risk in individual checklists and the trending of behavioral variance as 
checklists are gathered and analyzed. Behavioral safety processes that fail to identify risk cause 
range restriction in the observation data. Range restriction occurs when the standard deviation of 
the behavioral data is so small that most of the data falls within a narrow range of the scale.  
Range restriction occurs in behavioral safety when observers are lenient and rate all pinpoints on 
a checklist as “all safe” consistently across observations. Results of data analysis then suggest 
that nearly 100% of the time behaviors are safe. When this happens it gives us the misconception 
that there are no at-risk behaviors to target. Behavioral safety processes need to find variance that 
include at-risk behaviors to identify and mitigate the events that result in injury. 
Analyses of at-risk behavior are conducted on behaviors with the most variance (low safe 
percentages), however, if there is no variance in the data due to range restriction, analyses may 
be completed on behaviors that are not truly deviant (near 100% safe) or neglected altogether.  
Further, if there is no variation in observation data, the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of 
interventions is limited. Finally, restriction of range resulting from a leniency effect (i.e., “all 
safe”) may indicate to management that the workers are performing their tasks safety. However, 
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when incidents occur related to behaviors rated “all safe” management may infer the process to 
be ineffective.  
A general checklist may be more likely to produce range restriction whereas a specific 
checklist may result in more variance. In data reported by the CCBS from 2009-2015, a grocery 
distribution facility utilized a general checklist for its behavioral safety program. The data found 
that Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) use was consistently safe over 18 consecutive weeks 
resulting in a restriction of range in their data, minimizing their ability to identify risk. Due to the 
organization’s stagnant, albeit safe, performance around PPE it was removed from the checklist 
to pinpoint more specific tasks/behaviors that were critical to the employees’ safety (CCBS, 
2017). This resulted in pinpoints (e.g., “stop vehicle, look, and beep horn when approaching 
intersection”) that identified more risk and minimized the restriction of range evident before in 
the general pinpoint. Cooper (2006) demonstrated similar results in which selecting new, specific 
items every 4-5 months resulted in increased risk identification. It is hypothesized that more 
specific behavioral pinpoints used for observation will result in increased risk identified. 
  
Manager vs. Employee Pinpointing of Behavior 
Another variable that may affect risk identification is the subject matter experts who 
determine the pinpoints for behavioral observation. Historical safety data (e.g., injuries and close 
calls) and interviews with managers and employees are the first step in identifying pinpoints for 
observation and analysis (Wilder, Lipschultz, King, Driscoll, & Sigurdsson, 2018). Typically, a 
group process is then used to nominate and prioritize pinpoints for inclusion on behavioral 
observation checklists.   
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Behavioral safety programs have utilized both employees and managers for pinpointing 
critical behaviors within the group process (Myers et al., 2010; Sulzer-Azaroff, Loafman, 
Merante, & Hlavacek, 1990). Cooper (2006) used volunteer employee work groups to develop 
pinpoints from the incident data. These employees then conducted functional analyses to 
determine the contingencies controlling the behaviors. These lists of behaviors were then 
discussed among employee workgroups to determine a final list of 20 pinpointed behaviors for 
observation. The author found a 45% reduction in the total number of injuries from baseline to 
intervention, demonstrating the success of employee driven pinpointed behaviors.  
In contrast, Reber and Wallin (1984) developed pinpoints with only front line 
supervisors. These efforts resulted in approximately 35% reduction of total incidents. Myers et 
al. (2010) utilized a mixed group of employees and managers for the development of a critical 
behavior checklist. There intervention was successful in reducing OSHA recordable rates from 
an average of 4.14 during baseline to 0.79 during the behavioral process.  
Copeland, Ludwig, Bergman, and Acikgoz (2018) conducted a focus group meeting 
where employees were asked to identify behaviors for self-observation and feedback. Three of 
their six pinpoints were empirically related to the desired outcome (sales). During the duration of 
the study, management introduced four new behaviors, only one of which was shown to be 
relevant to the outcome. Results indicate that employees are excellent subject matter experts for 
identification of behaviors that are crucial to their performance, perhaps better than management. 
The behavioral safety literature recommends that employees drive pinpointing in 
behavioral safety programs (Bumstead & Boyce, 2005; Depasquale & Geller, 1999; Krause et 
al., 1999; Ludwig & Geller, 1997; McSween, 2003). An employee-designed checklist may be 
more likely to identify risk because the items can be generated from their direct experiences. For 
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example, employees in a pinpointing meeting would reflect on their current work conditions and 
what is hazardous to their job, and a management meeting would be driven by referring to 
written policies and procedures for the design of safety pinpoints (McSween, 2003).  
The perception that one can get punished or get someone else in trouble for identifying 
risk may lead to employees only identifying safe practices in the observation checklist, resulting 
in leniency and range restriction. The expectation of punishment may be diminished in an 
employee pinpointing process as items selected are areas that employees are seeking to identify 
and mitigate risk to keep one another safe, making the observation process more reinforcing 
(Bumstead & Boyce, 2005). In a management driven process, the items may be designed to 
control safety behaviors and be developed into policy. Designing pinpoints around rules and 
policies may not capture the variance in behavior that employees could identify. The 
management process may also lead to perceptions that negative consequences will occur for the 
identification of risk (McSween, 2003).  
There has been no investigation into whether employees or managers create more critical 
pinpoints that better identify risk. It is anticipated that employee specific checklists will conform 
to behavioral criteria and identify more risk than management driven checklists.  
Current Study 
The current study focuses on investigating which behavioral safety processes are most 
effective at finding variance/at-risk behavior. Differences between the amount of variance around 
risks identified and level of risk identified in general versus specific pinpoints were compared. 
Critical behaviors developed by management and employees were also compared for 
identification of risk. 
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This study examined the effects of employee and management identified specific 
pinpoints for observation checklists at a chemical manufacturing plant. A division within the 
plant had a long-standing behavioral safety process that used management-driven general 
behavioral categories for the checklists. In this study, these general checklists were revised to 
create task-specific checklists. Two departments developed their checklist through management 
participation while one other department developed through employee participation. Two other 
departments were used as control groups that made no changes to the general checklist.  
Departments in which employees led the pinpointing were expected to select pinpoints 
that better conform to behavioral criteria on critical tasks. Additionally, employee pinpointing is 
expected to produce a higher number of at-risk behavior when employees engage in the 
observation process within behavioral safety. 
An exploratory variable explored as part of the study were management initiatives (i.e., 
“action items”) attempting to mitigate potential for injury were collected. Action items can be 
created after lagging indicators, (e.g., injuries, worksite audits, and equipment failures) occur. 
Action items also can be created leading indicators such as behavioral observations which lead to 
preventative interventions before an incident occurs. Differences in action items created from 
leading and lagging indicators were explored post-hoc. 
Methods 
Participants and Setting 
The industry partner in this study was a Fortune 500 chemical manufacturing plant of 
approximately 8,000 employees who allowed access to five departments involved in the 
manufacturing of various polymers sold to other businesses for use in the production of 
consumer goods and maintenance of equipment. The plant was in operation seven days a week 
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and 24 hours a day. Team managers and worker crews would work alternating schedules, rotating 
between four consecutive day shifts, three consecutive night shifts, three consecutive day shifts, 
and four consecutive night shifts. The order of these shifts vary across four different crews.  
Three experimental departments (i.e., Departments A, B, & C) transitioned from a 
general to a specific checklist through group processes involving either managers or employees. 
These three experimental departments were selected by the division leadership for intervention 
due to an increase in recent injuries. Two additional comparison departments (i.e., Departments 
D & E) did not engage in any changes to their existing behavioral safety process and were used 
as controls.  
Department A had approximately 39 workers, 2 team managers, a safety coordinator, 
maintenance coordinator, and a senior administrative assistant. Department A’s critical tasks 
were (a) set up and operation of heavy machinery, (b) utilizing industrial lift cranes to move 
materials and equipment, (c) cleaning and repair of industrial values, and (d) align and secure 
holding fixtures, cutting tools, attachments, accessories, or materials onto machines. Hazards, 
behavioral risks, and potential injuries within these tasks include (a) potential impact with 
moving machine and/or parts while operating machine (b) potential impact/crushing while 
moving materials/equipment with crane, (c) exposure to material and abrasions to eyes and face 
while cleaning valves (d) housekeeping hazards around leftover product materials (slips, trips, 
cuts, etc.).  
Department B had approximately 28 workers, one team manager, a safety coordinator, 
maintenance coordinator, and a scheduling planner. Department B’s critical tasks were (a) 
cleaning industrial equipment with high pressure water (3,000-10,000 psi), (b) cleaning 
production piping, (c) movement and maintenance of hydro blasting equipment, and (d) 
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coordinating job site reviews with production prior to cleaning. Hazards, behavioral risks, and 
potential injuries within these tasks include (a) slips, trips, falls, and cuts associated with 
increased water on jobsite (b) damaged hosing exposing high pressure water to employee, (c) 
risk of lacerations (d) opening of equipment not scheduled for cleaning and exposure to 
chemicals, and (e) exposure to material and abrasions to eyes and face while cleaning equipment.  
Department C had approximately 40 workers, 4 team managers, a safety coordinator, 
maintenance coordinator, and an engineering staff. Department C’s critical tasks were (a) 
collecting samples of product materials, (b) switching out pump drains, (c) blowing out lines, 
and (d) rodding dumpsters. Hazards, behavioral risks, and potential injuries within this task 
include (a) strains around arm, leg, and body positioning to collect samples, (b) being exposed to 
chemicals released upon opening valve, (c) strains around back and arms while loosening bolts 
on pump drain, (d) being exposed to built-up chemical pressure while removing pump, (e) being 
exposed to leftover chemical buildup while cleaning a line with hand tool, and (d) being exposed 
to chemical compound upon breaking up material with a rod. 
Department D had approximately 41 workers, 4 team managers, a safety coordinator, 
maintenance coordinator, and an engineering staff. Department E had approximately 40 workers, 
4 team managers, a safety coordinator, maintenance coordinator, and engineering staff. 
Department D and Es’ critical task were (a) collecting samples of product materials, (b) 
switching out pump drains, (c) emptying excess materials stored in buggy with forklift, and (d) 
moving raw and finished materials with forklifts. Hazards, behavioral risks, and potential injuries 
within this task include (a) strains around arm, leg, and body positioning to collect samples, (b) 
being exposed to chemicals released upon opening valve, (c) strains around back and arms while 
loosening bolts on pump drain, (d) being exposed to built-up chemical pressure while removing 
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pump, (e) potential impact/crushing while working around forklift and buggy, and (d) being 
exposed to chemical materials while maneuvering buggy. 
A nondisclosure agreement between the host organization and the researchers is included 
in Appendix A. This agreement outlines the use of nonidentifiable data from the host 
organization. The host University Internal Review Board (IRB) also approved the use of this data 
(IRB# 20-0051, Appendix B). 
Baseline Behavior-Based Safety Process 
 The host organization had implemented a Behavior Based-Safety (BBS) system 
approximately fifteen years prior to the intervention. Training videos and an observation 
checklist were purchased from a consulting vendor and used for new employees but had not been 
adapted to specific differences across departments.  
The BBS checklist contained 37 generic items that were not specific to any department. 
Instead, the checklist contained general categories descriptive of behavioral response classes 
(i.e., the product of many behaviors). Examples of items include, “hearing protection”, “eyes on 
path”, “hurrying/rushing”, and “struck by objects.” 
Managers and workers conducted observations by going out in the field and finding 
another worker, contractor, or maintenance employee to observe. There was no requirement to 
bring a paper version of the checklist into the plant for use in observations and personnel seldom 
used that option. Observers would then provide feedback to the employee based on their 
recollection of items from the observation checklist.   
The information from the observation would be entered in the electronic data system 
which contained the checklist. A worker was provided the option to select “safe”, “at-risk”, or 
“not observed” for each of the items on the checklist. A quota was in place for most workers to 
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complete a specified number of observations in a month. Departments A and B did not have a 
quota, Department C had a quota of six, and Departments D and E had a quota of five. 
Leadership in Department C decided to decrease the quota from six observations per month to 
one observation at the launch of the task-specific checklist. Towards the end of the month, a 
worker would receive an email reminder if they had not yet met the quota.  
A monthly safety meeting was held, during which workers were shown data around the 
most frequent occurring at-risk items and discussed ways to improve performance around the 
risk. No goals were set around the improvement of pinpoints and no attention was provided to 
previously made improvement around pinpoints.  
Research Design 
A multiple baseline (ABC) within (General to Specific Task-based checklist) and between 
(Manager vs. Employee Pinpointing) design (Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007) was utilized 
across five departments of a manufacturing company, staggering the implementation of a 
specific checklist across experimental departments. Each department employed a general 
checklist during the Baseline Phase. Towards the end of Baseline (A) the participating 
department was told that changes would be made to the checklist (A’). Then designated 
participants engaged in the pinpointing of critical task-specific behaviors and the development of 
the checklist (B). Finally, after checklists were published, the new checklist replaced the baseline 
checklist (C) for ongoing behavioral observations.   
The between-subjects comparison was made between departments where pinpointing was 
done by department leadership, team managers, and safety coordinators (i.e., Departments A and 
B) versus departments where pinpointing was done by workers within the department (i.e., 
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Department C). Departments D and E remained in baseline (A) over the duration of the study. A 
summary of the process timeline for each department can be found in Table 1.   
Intervention  
Introduction Meeting (A’). A meeting was held with department leadership and the safety 
coordinator to discuss the purpose of the project. Those in the meeting were told that the 
observation process was being redesigned to identify critical tasks and behaviors that are most 
important employee safety.  
Pinpointing (B). Available safety data from the prior three years were reviewed to 
identify patterns to determine what behaviors, environmental conditions, resulted in or were 
related to incidents and near misses specific to each department. Critical tasks that workers 
completed that resulted in an injury or a near miss were compiled based on their frequency and 
severity.  
A meeting was held to identify critical tasks and pinpoint behaviors for the development 
of the new task-specific checklist. The pinpoints were designed around high-hazard tasks 
required of workers in the department. In department A, attendees of the pinpointing meeting 
were department leadership, team managers, safety coordinators, and an internal behavioral 
safety expert. Department B attendees were managers and the training coordinator whose roles 
involved safety. In department C, attendees of this meeting were the workers within the 
department who conducted the pinpointing of task critical behaviors in collaboration with the 
behavioral safety expert. Each crew within department C (four crews total) had separate 
meetings to identify pinpoints around tasks they completed and perceived as most critical to 
safety. Management in department C were involved in the scheduling of crew meetings to meet 
with the behavioral expert but were not present or consulted with during the pinpointing meeting. 
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See Appendix C for complete protocol around pinpointing meeting and Appendix D for the tool 
used to develop pinpoints. 
The pinpointing meeting was started by describing the purpose of the meeting. The 
participants were then asked questions to pinpoint critical tasks that (a) require a lot of 
experience to learn, (b) have a lot of variation in safe performance, (c) are routinely performed 
but are associated with significant hazards, (d) are infrequent but complicated, and (e) happen 
when work gets busy. Critical tasks were prioritized and chosen for observation. Within each 
critical task, safe behaviors were pinpointed along with discussions of the variance that may 
occur that make the task riskier. From this process, a final list of critical tasks and behaviors 
were compiled for each experimental department.  
Pinpointed tasks and behaviors were then operationally defined into measurable 
behaviors. Behaviors were also worded to reflect safe performance and to pass the dead person 
test (e.g., “moved off platform after starting gear pump” vs. “did not move off platform after starting 
gear pump” or “Put on leather cuff gloves” vs. “was not wearing PPE”). These items were then 
compiled into a checklist specific to each critical task and department. Drafts of these checklists 
were reviewed by leaders, managers, and safety coordinators in departments A and B and other 
workers in departments C. 
Task-Specific Checklist Implementation (C). After revisions were made to the checklist, 
finalized versions were then published in the electronic data entry system. Managers and workers 
were then shown the completed versions in the electronic system and shown how to input the 
data. After this, data collection began using the specific checklist. 
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Dependent Variables  
Archival data were collected from various databases of the host organization. Behavioral 
safety process data (i.e., at-risk behavior and participation) were collected and stored in a third-
party database platform. Other measures indicative of the effectiveness of the behavioral safety 
process on other reporting such as near misses, action items, and hazard identifications, as well 
as outcome data (i.e., injuries and process safety events) were collected by employees, managers, 
and department leadership and were stored either in the third-party database or in individual 
database files within the company. These various data sources were gathered by internal 
members of the company and de-identified before being uploaded to an internet file storage site 
hosted by the organization. The data were then downloaded to the research institution’s secure 
files for analyses. 
This study analyzed three dependent variables: a) Pinpoints meeting behavioral criteria, 
b) risk identification, and c) the production of action items from the process. 
Behavioral Criteria. To determine how much each department’s intervention checklist 
conformed to Johnston & Pennypacker’s criterion for behavioral pinpoints (1980), both baseline 
and intervention checklists were scored on the seven-pinpoint criterion established. The pinpoint 
should state:  
(a) the bodily (or verbal) action that should happen (Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980; 
Mayer et al., 2019; Miller, 2006; White, 1971),  
(b) the physical thing in the environment the behavior is impacting (Johnston & 
Pennypacker, 1980),  
(c) when the behavior should occur (Kazdin, 1994; Mayer et al., 2019), and 
(d) what the behavior will achieve (Mayer et al., 2019; Miller, 2006).  
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The pinpoint must also be:  
(e) observable and measurable (Chance, 2006; Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980; Miller, 
2006; Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000; Sulzer-Azaroff & Fellner, 1984),  
(f) under the employee’s control (Daniels & Bailey, 2014; Sulzer-Azaroff & Fellner, 
1984), and  
(g) passes the dead-person test (Lindsley, 1991).  
Eleven research assistants “blind” to the study were trained on the pinpointing criteria 
(see Appendix E for training slides). After the initial training, the research assistants completed a 
practice set of 5 pinpoints and scored the pinpoints based on the seven criteria and were rated for 
agreement against the primary researcher’s ratings using trial-by-trial interobserver agreement 
(IOA; Cooper et al., 2007). 
Average IOA during practice was 75%. After the practice session, the researcher 
provided feedback to the group and discussed any pinpoints that were scored differently. After 
feedback, the research assistants completed a second practice set resulting in an average IOA of 
80%. Six researchers with IOA above 80% (range: 83-92%) were chosen as raters for the 
pinpoints generated by the departments.  
Baseline and intervention checklist items were randomized across participating 
department checklists and research assistant scored each checklist item independently on the 
seven-pinpoint criterion (see Appendix F for the rating form). A score was calculated for each 
pinpoint based on the mean across the six raters. Pinpoint scores could range from 0-7, with each 
pinpoint criterion met adding a point to the overall score. 
Risk identification. Response options on departmental behavioral checklists included 
“safe,” “at-risk” or “not observed” for each pinpoint. Risk was considered to be identified if the 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 25 
 
response selected was “at-risk.” The data included the date of the observation, the department the 
observation took place in, and response option selected for each pinpoint (see Appendix G for the 
electronic checklist interface).  
Action items. Action Items are management initiatives to improve safety. These can 
include repair of equipment, new tool design, improvement in work procedures, additional safety 
guards, planned training, etc. Action items can be generated from lagging outcomes such as, 
injuries, worksite audits, and equipment failures. Action items created from behavioral 
observations (leading indicators) demonstrate management acting upon hazardous conditions and 
risks prior to adverse safety outcomes (e.g., injuries, equipment failures). Tracking these with 
risk identified would directly link the observation process with the improvement of safety. These 
data can be directly linked to behavioral observation data as the database interface allows for an 
action item to be developed immediately after risk is identified and selected from the observation 
interface (see Appendix H for the interface). Both the action items from the lagging indicators 
(e.g., injuries, audits, equipment failures) and action items specifically created from behavioral 
observations were collected. 
Exploratory Variables 
Injuries. Injury data were collected from the organization’s electronic data storage 
system. Employees report to their supervisor any level of injury, ranging from incidents not 
requiring first aid, incidents requiring first aid (OSHA recordable), and injuries that result in lost 
time and days away from work. The injury is then documented and entered. 
Results 
Data collection occurred over 21-months (90 consecutive weeks) resulting in a total of 
5,802 behavioral observations across the five departments. (Department A: 1311 observations; 
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Department B: 144 observations; Department C: 860 observations; Department E: 1,961 
observations; Department F: 1,526 observations).  
During the baseline condition, data were excluded if there was only one observation 
contributing to the weekly percentage within a department. The exclusionary criteria resulted in 
nine data points removed from department B’s data and one from each of departments A, C, D, 
and E. After the intervention that changed checklists to task-specific items, observations were 
limited in frequency to the occasions that the pinpointed tasks were performed in each 
department. Therefore, the one observation per week criterion was not applied for departmental 
intervention data. No further adaptations were made to the data.  
During pinpointing, Department A identified 8 critical tasks, averaging 3.5 items per task 
(range: 2-5), for a total of 28 items on the checklist. Department B identified 12 critical tasks, 
averaging 4.66 items per task (range: 1-10), for a total of 56 items on the checklist. Department 
C identified 6 critical tasks, averaging 2.5 items per task (range: 1-4), for a total of 15 items on 
the checklist. Departments D and E were the control departments and had no changes to their 
general checklist. 
Criterion Ratings of Behavioral Pinpointing  
See Table 2 for the research assistants’ pinpoint ratings on all baseline checklist pinpoints 
and Table 3 for ratings on all task-specific items. Figure 2 displays the distribution of the average 
pinpoint ratings for the checklist items for all departments during Baseline and Task-specific 
Checklist. Pinpoint criterion average scores were calculated with all six research-team raters’ 
scores across all pinpoints for each checklist. Pinpoint scores could range from 0-7. The average 
behavioral pinpoint criteria met per item in Department A’s baseline checklist was 2.36 (SD = 
1.85). Department B’s baseline checklist pinpoint score average was 2.45 (SD = 1.74). 
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Department C’s baseline checklist average pinpoint criteria met per item was 0.84 (SD = 1.20). 
The average pinpoint criteria met per item in Department A’s task-specific checklist was 1.96 
(SD = 1.61). Department B’s task-specific checklist pinpoint score average was 2.31 (SD = 1.62). 
Department C’s task-specific checklist average pinpoint criteria met per item was 4.96 (SD = 
1.34). See Table 4 for the average and standard deviation of pinpoint scoring per item for each 
department during both phases. The higher pinpoint scores in the employee driven department 
supports the hypothesis that employees would develop pinpoints more likely to meet behavioral 
criteria.  
Matching Categories Across General and Task-Specific Checklists 
Items on the Baseline general checklist and items on the Intervention task-specific 
checklists were nonequivalent. There could not be a direct comparison between a general item 
relating to a response class containing many behaviors (e.g., tools and equipment) and a task-
specific item containing a specific behavior (e.g., “put on respirator when trying to unplug 
tank”). Therefore, pinpoints from the specific checklists were categorized into the prior general 
behavioral categories established in Baseline. The researcher and another subject matter expert 
categorized each task-specific pinpoint into a general category. Any discrepancies were 
discussed between the two raters until an agreement was met for each item categorization. IOA 
was not calculated for the pinpoint categorizations.  
Six baseline categories were established for data analysis:  
• Personal protective equipment (PPE). PPE pinpoints are those that involve selection 
and use of personal protective equipment (e.g., “harness is worn correctly”). 
• Body use. Body use pinpoints involve direct movement of the employee body (e.g., 
“correct lifting technique?” and “stood on side of valve opening?”). 
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• Tools and equipment. Tools and equipment involved pinpoints relating to the 
selection, use, and maintenance of tools and/or equipment (e.g., “lifting device 
inspected prior to use” and “set up air horn prior to opening sample valve”). 
• Policies and procedures. Policies and procedures include pinpoints around employee 
communication, permits, and procedure adherence (e.g., “Confined Space Permit fill 
out correctly” and “using personnel lift to perform task? 2 trained lift operators?”). 
• Environment and housekeeping. Environment and housekeeping included pinpoints 
aimed at the housekeeping and maintenance of the operations area (e.g., “floor free of 
coolant & waste oil” and “cutters stored with covers in place”). 
• Positioning of people. Positioning of people involved pinpoints designed to minimize 
employee overexertion or coming into contact with excessive temperatures (e.g., 
“extreme temperature precautions taken” and “using techniques to minimize 
excessive force”).  
See Table 5 for experimental department categories and Table 6 for control department 
categories. Table 7 contains the total number of pinpoints per category and percentage of total 
pinpoints for each department’s task-specific checklist. 46% of employee pinpoints were 
categorized in the Body Use categorization. Approximately 27% of management pinpoints were 
in Environment-and-Housekeeping, and 22% in Policies-and-Procedures. In both employees and 
management, around 33% of the pinpoints were categorized in Tools-and-Equipment. 
Risk Identification  
Statistical Process Control (SPC) was used to determine significant changes in variability 
for the risk identified during baseline and intervention (Mainstone & Levi, 1988; Pfadt & 
Wheeler, 1995). Upper and Lower Control limits (three standard deviations), Central lines (mean 
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of the time series), and two-sigma limits (two standard deviations) were calculated and 
variability was analyzed using Pfadt and Wheelers’ (1995) four detection rules for detection of 
special cause of variation (i.e., significant differences): (a) a single point is outside of the upper 
or lower control limits; (b) two of three data points land outside of two-sigma limits away from 
the central line; (c) four out of five consecutive data points fall on the same side and more than 
one sigma unit away (from the central line) indicates special cause of variation; and (d) eight 
consecutive data points fall on the same side of the central line. Each behavioral category was 
analyzed for changes in risk identified trends representing special cause variation (i.e., statistical 
significance).  
Risk identification was calculated as the total number of at-risk behavior observed, 
divided by the sum of the safe and at-risk behavior responses, multiplied by 100 for a percentage.   
Personal protective equipment. Figure 3 depicts the PPE categorized pinpoints’ weekly 
risk identification percentage at all five departments across baseline and the intervention of the 
task-specific checklist. Table 8 reports the means, standard deviations, and upper control limits 
for each department during both phases.  
 Department A showed a decrease of 1 percentage point in mean risk identified from 
baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. The baseline upper control limit was not 
surpassed with the implementation of the task-specific checklist. A mean increase of 3 
percentage points occurred in Department B from baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. 
Two data points appeared outside baseline upper control limit of 0.0% indicating potential 
statistical significance and recalculation of control limits. After each data point, an immediate 
return to baseline level occurred. Therefore, it was determined not to recalculate the upper 
control limits. Department C experienced a mean decrease of 0.2 percentage points from baseline 
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to task-specific checklist intervention. The baseline upper control limit was not surpassed. PPE 
did not vary at either of the control departments (i.e., Department D & E). The data from the PPE 
category refutes the hypothesis that task-specific behavioral pinpoints would identify more risk 
than general pinpoints.  
Body use. Figure 4 depicts the body use categorized pinpoints weekly risk identification 
percentage at all five departments across baseline and the intervention of the task-specific 
checklist. Table 9 reports the means, standard deviations, and upper control limits for each 
department during both phases. 
 Department A showed a decrease of 0.5 percentage points in mean risk identified from 
baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. The baseline upper control limit was not 
surpassed with the implementation of the task-specific checklist. A mean decrease of 0.3 
percentage points occurred in Department B from baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. 
The baseline upper control limit was not surpassed with the implementation of the task-specific 
checklist. Department C showed an increase of 9.1 percentage points from baseline to task-
specific checklist intervention. Four data points appeared outside the baseline upper control limit 
of 3.7% indicating statistical significance and recalculation of the control limits. A new upper 
control limit was calculated during the intervention data at 51.9%. Body use did not vary at 
either of the control departments (i.e., Department D & E). The data from the Body Use category 
supports the hypothesis that task-specific behavioral pinpoints would identify more risk than 
general pinpoints. Evidence also supports the hypothesis that employee pinpoints would identify 
more risk than management pinpoints. 
Tools and equipment. Figure 5 displays the tools and equipment categorized pinpoints 
weekly risk identification percentage at all five departments across baseline and the intervention 
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of the task-specific checklist. Table 10 reports the means, standard deviations, and upper control 
limits for each department during both phases. 
 Department A showed a decrease of 1.7 percentage point in mean risk identified from 
baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. The baseline upper control limit was not 
surpassed with the implementation of the task-specific checklist. Department B demonstrated an 
increase of 17.7 percentage points from baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. 10 data 
points appeared outside the baseline upper control limit of 6.8% indicating statistical significance 
and recalculation of the control limits. Due to this special cause of variance, a new upper control 
limit was calculated during the task-specific intervention at 66.2%. Department C showed an 
increase of 19.8 percent points in mean risk identified from baseline to task-specific checklist 
intervention. Six data points were outside the baseline upper control limit of 4.6% indicating 
statistical significance and recalculation of the control limits. Therefore, a new upper control 
limit was calculated during the intervention data at 82.4%. Department D (control) showed one 
data point outside the control limit and a new upper control limit was calculated and applied to 
the full dataset 6.6%. Tools and equipment did not vary at control department E. The data from 
the tools-and-equipment categorization supports the hypothesis that task-specific behavioral 
pinpoints would identify more risk than general pinpoints. Evidence does not supports the 
hypothesis that employee pinpoints would identify more risk than management pinpoints. 
Policies and procedures. Figure 6 displays the tools and equipment categorized 
pinpoints’ weekly risk identification percentage at all five departments across baseline and the 
intervention of the task-specific checklist. Table 11 reports the means, standard deviations, and 
upper control limits for each department during both phases. 
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 Department A showed a decrease of 0.4 percentage points in mean risk identified from 
baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. The baseline upper control limit was not 
surpassed with the implementation of the task-specific checklist. Department B demonstrated an 
increase of 6.3 percentage points from baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. Six data 
points appeared outside the baseline upper control limit of 6.6% indicating statistical significance 
and recalculation of the control limits. Due to this special cause of variance, a new upper control 
limit was calculated during the task-specific intervention at 24.1%. Department C showed a 
decrease of 0.6 percentage points from baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. The 
baseline upper control limit was not surpassed with the implementation of the task-specific 
checklist. Policies and procedures did not vary at either of the control departments (i.e., 
Department D & E). The data from the policies-and-procedures categorization does not support 
the hypothesis that task-specific behavioral pinpoints would identify more risk than general 
pinpoints. Evidence does not supports the hypothesis that employee pinpoints would identify 
more risk than management pinpoints. 
Environmental and housekeeping. Figure 7 displays the environment and housekeeping 
categorized pinpoints weekly risk identification percentage at all five departments across 
baseline and the intervention of the task-specific checklist. Table 12 reports the means, standard 
deviations, and upper control limits for each department during both phases. 
 Department A showed a decrease of 2.5 percentage points in mean risk identification 
from baseline to intervention. The baseline upper control limit was not surpassed with the 
implementation of the task-specific checklist. Department B demonstrated a decrease of 1.7 
percentage points from baseline to task-specific checklist intervention. The baseline upper 
control limit was not surpassed with the implementation of the task-specific checklist. 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 33 
 
Department C did not have any pinpoints in the environmental and housekeeping categorizing 
and therefore had no data during the task-specific checklist phase. Department D (control) 
showed two data point outside the control limit at 5.0%. Department E (control) showed three 
data points outside the control limit at 12.8%. The data for environment-and-housekeeping 
categorization does not supports the hypothesis that task-specific behavioral pinpoints would 
identify more risk than general pinpoints. 
Positioning of people. Figure 8 displays the positioning of people categorized pinpoints 
weekly risk identification percentage at all five departments across baseline and the intervention 
of the task-specific checklist. Table 13 reports the means, standard deviations, and upper control 
limits for each department during both phases. 
 Department A showed a decrease of 0.9 percentage points in mean risk identification 
from baseline to intervention. The baseline upper control limit was not surpassed with the 
implementation of the task-specific checklist. Department B demonstrated no change in 
percentage points from baseline to task-specific checklist. Department C demonstrated no change 
in percentage points from baseline to task-specific checklist. Positioning of people did not vary 
at either of the control departments (i.e., Department D & E). The data for the positioning-of-
people categorization refutes the hypothesis that task-specific behavioral pinpoints would 
identify more risk than general pinpoints. Evidence does not supports the hypothesis that 
employee pinpoints would identify more risk than management pinpoints. 
Action Items 
 Figure 9 depicts the cumulative number of action items created from behavioral 
observations and the cumulative action items created from other sources (i.e., injuries, audits, 
and equipment failures), across all departments for both phases. Table 14 reports the overall rates 
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for action items created from behavioral observations and overall rates for action items created 
from other sources across all departments for both phases. Rates were calculated by taking the 
total number of action items, divided by the total number of weeks per phase.  
For Department A overall response rate for action items from behavioral observations 
was 0 and action items from other sources was 8.7 over the 68 baseline weeks. During 
intervention, Department A’s rate of action item creation from behavioral observations remained 
at 0 and action items from other sources was 2.3 over 22 weeks. For Department B the overall 
response rate for action items from behavioral observations was 0 and action items from other 
sources was 7 over 72 baseline weeks. During intervention, Department B’s response rate for 
action items from behavioral observations was 0.0 and action items from other sources was 3.9 
over 16 consecutive weeks. For Department C the overall rate for action items created from 
behavioral observations was 0 and action items from other sources was 0.1 over 78 baseline 
weeks. During intervention, Department C’s rate for action items from behavioral observations 
was 1.8 per week and action items from other sources was 0 per week over 11 consecutive 
weeks. For Department D (control) the overall response rate for action items from behavioral 
observations was 0 and action items from other sources was 0.5 over 89 consecutive weeks. For 
Department E (control) the overall response rate for action items from behavioral observations 
was 0 and action items from other sources was 0.2 over 91 consecutive weeks. 
Injuries 
Table 15 reports the injuries for each department during baseline and the task-specific 
checklist phase. Department A and B had 14 and 31 injuries respectively, Department C had 3 
injuries, and Departments D and E had 4 and 7 injuries respectively. 
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Discussion 
 The current study evaluated whether task-specific behavioral pinpoints meeting the 
behavioral criterion would identify more risk than general pinpoints. Management and employee 
driven pinpoints were also compared. Overall results indicate that task-specific checklists were 
more successful at aiding workers in identify risk during the observation process than general 
checklist. Specifically, the employee-designed pinpoints were more likely to conform to the 
seven-pinpoint behavioral criteria (Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980) and were associated with 
more risks identified during the subsequent observation process. Employee driven processes also 
resulted in the creation of more preventative action items during the observation process.  
Employee-Driven Pinpoint Process Resulted in More Specific Checklist Items 
The present study provided evidence that employee-driven pinpoint processes may result 
in more specific checklist items that match the behavioral criterion. Employees in Department C 
created pinpoints that had higher average behavioral criterion scores when compared to the 
management driven pinpoints created in Department A & B. Employee pinpoint scores also had 
the lowest standard deviation across research-team raters indicating reliable interpretations of 
pinpoints as behavioral. Agreement among multiple observers is a necessary feature of a 
behavioral definition for it to be observable and measurable consistently (Hawkins & Dobes, 
1977; Kazdin, 1994; Miller, 2006). Manager created pinpoints had more variability amongst the 
raters scoring which could be indicative of unclear behavioral pinpoints. The finding that trained 
raters had more variability in their interpretation of pinpoints may be suggestive of the same 
phenomena in the workplace where workers may interpret ambiguous pinpoints differently from 
each other.  
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The majority of employee pinpoints targeted their immediate task and body movements, 
indicative of behavioral incidents. Management pinpoints had some behavioral incidents but also 
were likely to also targeted procedure following and housekeeping (e.g., “Location & tested 
shower and eye wash”), indicative of the product of behaviors representative of more general 
response classes). Around half of the management pinpoints were in the Policies-and-Procedures 
and Environment-and-Housekeeping categories. These difference in pinpoint categories support 
the notion that management would design pinpoints around “managing” safety with policies and 
procedures. Because departments A and B performed maintenance work around equipment, their 
hazards may be more related to the condition of their tools and the equipment. As a result, it is 
understandable that their pinpoints were focused less on behavior but more around equipment 
conditions. For example, the checklist item “flange and pipe ends cleaned with rigid lance” did 
not meet the full pinpoint criterion, yet may be critical to employee safety because this act limits 
employee exposure to harmful chemicals.  
In contrast, nearly half of employee pinpoints were targeting the Body Use category 
compared to around 10% of the management pinpoints. Body use may be the category that 
contains the most pinpoints that conform to the behavioral criterion. It certainly was the 
preferred category of the employees participating in the focus group. As employees engage in 
their current work conditions, the specific operation of their body either put them at risk in the 
moment or keeps them from coming into contact with the hazards. Targeting body movement 
may be reflective of employee participants’ intimate contact with the specific behaviors needed 
to avoid their workplace hazards. 
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Employee-Driven Pinpoint Process Resulted in More Risk Identification 
Overall, the implementation of the task-specific checklist had the largest impact in risk 
identification when the pinpoints were developed by the employees. In other words, employee-
developed pinpoints resulted in more behaviors rated at-risk during the peer-to-peer behavioral 
observation process following checklist revisions. However, this result needs to be interpreted 
with caution as our findings are mixed and need to be replicated.  
Employee-driven pinpoints increased risk identification in the Body Use and Tools-and-
Equipment categories. The employee driven pinpoints increased risk identification around 10 
percentage points in the Body Use categorization and nearly 20 percentage points in the Tools-
and-Equipment categorization. Only two of the management pinpoints were associated with 
increased risk identification when used for observations (i.e., Tools-and-Equipment and Policies-
and-Procedures). This finding was limited to the management pinpoints in Department B’s 
observation process around Tools-and-Equipment which was associated with an 18 percentage 
point increase in risk identification and Policies-and-Procedures, which was a 6 percentage point 
increase. 
In sum, employee-driven processes had both conformed best to our behavioral criterion 
and were associated with increases in risk identification in the observation process. Both 
management-driven processes developed pinpoints failed to conform to our behavioral criterion.  
In fact, their new pinpoint scores were lower than the general categories present during baseline.  
Except for Department B’s pinpoints in Tools-and-Equipment and Policies-and-Procedures, 
management-driven process demonstrated no change in risk identification across all behavioral 
categories. This finding coincides with lower pinpointing criterion scores in the management 
pinpointing process. These results provide evidence that suggest pinpoints that conform to 
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behavioral criteria may result in increased risk identification across some behavioral categories, 
at least when employees create the pinpoints. 
Checklist Length 
  Differences in the task-specific checklist length were explored post-hoc. The employee 
driven process adopted the shortest checklist whereas management driven processes resulted in 
the longest checklists. The employee checklist had 15 items while the two management 
checklists had 28 and 56 items (departments A and B respectively). It has long been known 
(Miller, 1956) that humans can retain only around seven, plus or minus two, pieces of 
information, with more modern estimates ranging from 3-5 depending on the complexity of the 
stimuli and other variables (Cowan, 2000). If the checklist is long and exceeds employees 
working memory capacity, rating accuracy may be lower than a shorter, more pinpointed 
checklist. This could result in the identification of fewer at-risk behaviors when the observer is 
unable to retain what they observed and then mark less salient items as safe. Although employees 
created the shortest checklist, risk was not identified across all behavioral categories. The longest 
checklist developed by managers also identified more risk than the other management checklist 
that had less items. Although employees adopted shorter checklists than their manager 
counterparts, these results suggest that checklist length may not be the critical feature impacting 
the amount of risk identified. 
Action Items 
Action items are management initiatives to improve safety. Incidents like injuries, audits, 
and equipment failures often result in the creation of an action item. Unfortunately, the action to 
improve safety thereby often occurs after the incident related to injury, error or failure had 
already happened. These action items are reactive and lag the injury. Creating action items from 
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behavioral observations is a proactive method to design changes. Behavior observations obtain 
information about the current work environment and behaviors that are occurring in the 
workforce, both safe and at-risk. Identifying variance in these behaviors allows for intervention 
design to mitigate risk prior to an incident occurring. Behavioral observations also allow for 
information on current conditions to be collected directly from front-line employees.  
No action items were created from behavioral observations during baseline and only the 
employee-driven process resulted in the creation of action items during the task-specific 
checklist implementation. Management processes submitted more action items from other 
sources (e.g., injuries, audits, and equipment failures) compared to the employee process and the 
control Departments (D & E). The high rate of action items like these may be because 
management departments experienced the highest number of injuries (Table 15), resulting in 
action items following investigation. These departments were a maintenance function which may 
have increased the rate of action items related to equipment failures.  
After the implementation of the task-specific checklist, the employee-driven process was 
the only department to begin an increase in action items created from behavioral observations. 
An overall rate of 1.8 action items per week were developed from the employee-driven process. 
The employee-driven pinpoints were associated with increases in risk identification, which were 
associated with the increase in preventative action items generated from behavioral observations. 
This supports McSween and Morans’ (2017) assertion that the identification of high-risk tasks 
and clearly defined behavior pinpoints would result in better initiatives to mitigate future risk.   
Increasing action items created from behavioral observations is critical as observations 
are leading indicators that can be acted upon to mitigate the potential of SIFs, whereas action 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 40 
 
items from other sources are lagging and are created after the injury, equipment failure, or SIF 
has already occurred.   
Injuries 
Specific checklists and pinpoints are designed to capture variance in high-risk tasks. 
Identifying variance in these tasks may provide more information for eventual systematic 
intervention to minimize risk and prevent injury. A general checklist may not identify variance in 
behavior as the pinpoints are too ambiguous. A specific checklist should have pinpoints that are 
unambiguous and result in greater identification of risk. 
In the current study, task-specific pinpoints, with greater criterion scores, did result in 
increased risk identification. Risk identification also was associated with an increase in the 
creation of preventative action items to minimize hazards. However, no inferences can be made 
as to whether the task-specific checklists resulted in a decrease of injuries for any departments as 
the duration of the task-specific checklist intervention was limited. Correlations could be 
conducted to examine the relationship between task-specific checklist risk identified and injuries. 
However, as injuries are a low base rate event it may not be statistically feasible to predict such 
outcomes. 
Limitations  
A limitation to the study is the length of the intervention. The longest intervention phase 
data were collected for 23 weeks (Department A) and the shortest at 11 weeks (Department C). 
The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic further truncated behavioral observation collection due to plant 
slowdowns and social distancing. Preliminary results indicate that risk identification increased 
when employees identified and adopted task-specific pinpoints. However, long-term data 
collection is required to determine if the increases in risk identification can be maintained.  
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A potential confounding variable was the reduction of the quota in the employee 
pinpointing process. The employee pinpointing process decreased the required quota from six to 
one, at the onset of the intervention. The change in quota may have been correlated with the 
increases in risk identification found in Department C’s Body Use and Tools-and-Equipment 
categories. However, as none of the other categories increased risk identification that does not 
appear to be the case. One of the management driven processes (Department B) also 
demonstrated an increase in risk identification during the task-specific checklist implementation 
and had no change to the quota from baseline. The results suggest that the change in quota may 
not have influenced the task-specific checklist intervention. 
Another limitation is how frequently specific tasks may be available for observation, 
creating gaps in the data. If a task did not occur in a given week, an observation could not be 
recorded. This can be seen in Department C’s Policies and Procedures categorization, in which 
six consecutive weeks passed between observations of the targeted infrequent task.  
The risk identification calculation is also impacted by the frequency of task occurrence. If 
a given task only occurred once that week then only one observation could occur. The data from 
the one observation would then be used to calculate the weekly risk identification percentage. 
The calculation would result in drastic percentages. For example, in week 81 department C had 
0% risk identification for the Tools-and-Equipment categorization. The percentage was 
calculated off one observation of an infrequent task which resulted in two pinpoints being scored 
as safe for that observation.   
A limitation to the study were the mixed results found in risk identification across the 
behavioral categories. As risk identification was the primary dependent variable of the study 
demonstrating control in its changes was important. Despite the increased pinpointing scores for 
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the employee pinpointing process, risk was not identified consistently across the behavioral 
categories. Increased variability only occurred in Body Use and Tools-and-Equipment categories 
with no change in PPE, Policies-and-Procedures, and Positioning of People. A potential 
explanation for these results may be that pinpoints in PPE, Policies and Positioning were already 
occurring safely nearly all the time. For example, the PPE category had one pinpoint, “put on 
(PPE) prior to touching bolts with hand” and Position of People asked, “if bolt is too hot, took 
break to avoid heat.” Both items were related to the same task and it is likely that putting on 
gloves minimized the risk of heat exposure while working and therefore would coincide with a 
safe response in the second pinpoint. As PPE is commonly a frequently safe response (CCBS, 
2017) it is understandable if no risk occurred in these items. As their process matures, the 
employees may elect to drop these pinpoints from their checklist if near 100% safe observations 
continue. 
 Another limitation to the study was the lack of random assignment to intervention groups. 
By not randomly assigning experimental groups, the intervention may have been influenced by 
differences in the departments. Participation in the task-specific checklist intervention was 
selected by the division leadership. Determining whether pinpointing would be done by 
management or employees was also subjective to department leadership preferences. 
A limitation to the study was in how the checklist items were sorted into the categories. 
Because range restriction was present in the baseline checklist items it was not possible to 
correlate each task-specific pinpoint to a respective baseline pinpoint. Therefore, the researchers 
grouped the task-specific pinpoints into each baseline behavioral category without statistical 
evidence that the items were equivalent. 
 A final limitation are the history effects that may have impacted risk identification 
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outside of the task-specific checklist intervention. First, several departments experienced 
operational shutdowns over the course of the study. During these shutdowns the employee 
workforce is decreased and the equipment is no longer in production. These shutdowns severely 
limit the opportunities for observations to occur, especially during the task-specific intervention 
phase, as the task is no longer occurring. Second, other safety initiatives may have been 
occurring simultaneous to the task-specific checklist intervention. For example, over the course 
of the study changes to a work permit were ongoing and may have facilitated additional 
awareness around safety, which may have impacted the risk identification found. Third, the 2020 
COVID-19 outbreak limited the data collection as operation employees were required to limit 
interactions in the field, severely impacting the potential for behavioral observations. 
Practical Implications 
 The seven-pinpoint criteria, established in the behavior analytic literature and 
summarized here, can be used as a guide to develop and evaluate pinpoints for selection into 
behavioral safety checklists. Training facilitators of the pinpointing sessions on the seven-
pinpoint criteria may assist in the development of a task-specific pinpoint that may be more 
successful in identifying risk. 
 Involving employees in the pinpointing process may help practitioners develop better 
pinpoints around the behaviors proximal to the tasks employees engage in. This may be 
especially true of specific body movements that employees need to engage to avoid exposure to 
hazards. These pinpoints may prove to be most crucial in reducing workplace injuries. On the 
other hand, managers may be better candidates for assisting in pinpointing around policy-and-
procedures. The later recommendation should be proceeded with caution as the findings were 
mixed for manager success in pinpointing behaviors that resulted in risk identification. 
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 Lastly, task-specific checklists may be better suited for behavior categorizations around 
the immediate body movements and tools-and-equipment as opposed to PPE, policies-and-
procedures, and environment-and-housekeeping behaviors. Pinpoints around body movement 
and tools-and-equipment were shown to identify the most risk and led to the creation of more 
preventative action items. An organization seeking to identify risk and design interventions to 
mitigate that risk may be best suited to pinpoint behaviors within the body use and tools-and-
equipment categories. However, as each organization’s hazards are unique, practitioners should 
explore which behavioral categories warrant task-specific pinpoints on a case-by-case basis. The 
practitioner is then recommended to apply the seven-pinpoint criteria to behaviors within those 
tasks. 
Future Research 
In future research, studies should explore which of the seven-pinpoint criteria established 
in this study are necessary for the identification of risk in a behavioral safety process. 
Researchers could develope checklist items with different combinations of the pinpoint criteria 
then observe which items indentify more risk through behavioral observations. Including a 
correlational analysis between each pinpoint criteria and risk identified would provide further 
evidence for which criteria are necessary. 
A true comparision between general response class pinpoints and task-specific pinpoints 
could not be made in this study across all departments. The baseline checklists in Departments A 
and B met some of the pinpoint criteria and were not all general response class pinpoints. The 
baseline checklist items in Department C were general response class pinpoints. Results in 
Department C provided evidence that task-specific pinpoints resulted in more variance than the 
general response class checklist. Replicating the findings in Department C would provide further 
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evidence that task-specific pinpoints are better than general response classes in an observation 
process. The resulting study would answer previous calls for research on the subject (Wirth & 
Sigurdsson, 2008).  
Further research could explore what personnel are neccesary in the development of the 
specific pinpoints that identify risk. The results of this study found that employee pinpoints 
identified more risk in pinpoints categorized around Body Use,whereas one of the management 
driven departments demonstrated slight increases in risk identification in the Policies-and-
Procedures category. The employee driven pinpoints did not identify any risk in the Policies-and-
Procedures category and management pinpoints did not identify risk in the Body Use cateogry. 
Perhaps indicating that for the greatest risk identification to occur, employees should develop 
pinpoints that involve there immediate job and body movements, and managers should develop 
pinpoints around procedures and communication. Future research should explore these 
differences in poinpoint categories. 
Researchers could also explore which of the categories should be pinpointed for risk 
identification. In the current study, although pinpoints were created around PPE and 
Environment-and-Housekeeping, minimal risk was identified with these pinpoints. A task-
specific checklist should identify high-hazard and high-variance tasks that could result in injury. 
By exploring the relationship between PPE and Environment-and-Housekeeping to injuries, 
researchers could determine whether these behavioral categories warrant pinpointing for a task-
specifc checklist. 
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Summary 
 The current study demonstrated preliminary evidence that task-specific checklists 
identify more risk in a behavioral observation process and result in the creation of more 
preventative action items than general checklist items. Employees also appear to be better subject 
matter experts in developing behavioral pinpoints for task specfic checklist compared to 
management. Finally, this study provides a base direction for research to further investigate how 
behavioral safety can be improved to identify critical tasks to minize potential for SIFs and limit 
human suffering in the workplace. 
  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 47 
 
References 
Bumstead, A., & Boyce, T. E. (2005). Exploring the effects of cultural variables in the 
implementation of behavior-based safety in two organizations. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior Management, 24, 43–63. doi: 10.1300/J075v24n04_03 
Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS]. (2018a). Employer-reported workplace injuries and illnesses 
2017, USDL-18-1788. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS]. (2018b). National census of fatal occupational injuries in 
2017, USDL-18-1978. 
Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. (2017, June 29). Companies achieving behavioral 
safety accreditation. Retrieved from https://behavior.org/help-
centers/safety/Accredited%20Companies/ 
Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. (2020, March 15). Companies achieving behavioral 
safety accreditation. Retrieved from https://behavior.org/help-
centers/safety/Accredited%20Companies/ 
Chance, P. (2006). Learning & Behavior (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. 
Cooper, J. O., Heron, T. E., & Heward, W. L. (2007). Applied Behavior Analysis (2nd ed.). Upper 
Sadle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 
Cooper, M. D. (2006). Exploratory analyses of the effects of managerial support and feedback 
consequences on behavioral safety maintenance. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26(3), 
1–41. doi: 10.1300/J075v26n03_01 
Cooper, M. D. (2009). Behavioral safety interventions: A review of process design factors. 
Professional Safety, 54, 36. 
Copeland, J. E., Ludwig, T. D., Bergman, S., & Acikgoz, Y. (2018). Increasing sales by 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 48 
 
managing the interlocking contingencies between sales representatives and customers using 
behavioral self-monitoring. Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 38, 116–143. 
doi: 10.1080/01608061.2017.1423147 
Cowan, N. (2000). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental 
storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87–185. doi: 
10.1017/S0140525X01003922 
Daniels, A. C., & Bailey, J. S. (2014). Performance Management Changing Behavior That 
Drives Organizational Effectiveness (5th ed.). Atlanta: Aubrey Daniels International, Inc. 
Depasquale, J. P., & Geller, E. S. (1999). Critical success factors for behavior-based safety: A 
study of twenty industry-wide applications. Journal of Safety Research, 30, 237–249. doi: 
10.1016/S0022-4375(99)00019-5 
Fellner, D. J., & Sulzer-Azaroff, B. (1984). Increasing industrial safety practices and conditions 
through posted feedback. Journal of Safety Research, 15, 7–21. doi: 10.1016/0022-
4375(84)90026-4 
Grindle, A. C., Dickinson, A. M., & Boettcher, W. (2000). Behavioral safety research in 
manufacturing settings: A review of the literature. Journal of Organizational Behavior 
Management, 20, 29–68. doi: 10.1300/J075v20n01_03 
Guo, B. H. W., Goh, Y. M., & Le Xin Wong, K. (2018). A system dynamics view of a behavior-
based safety program in the construction industry. Safety Science, 104, 202–215. doi: 
10.1016/j.ssci.2018.01.014 
Hawkins, R. P., & Dobes, R. R. (1977). Behavioral definitions in applied behavior analysis: 
Explicit or implicit? In J. M. Etzel, D. M. LeBlanc, & D. M. Baer (Eds.), New developments 
in behavioral research: Theory, method, and application (pp. 167–188). Hillsdale, NJ: 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 49 
 
Erlbaum. 
Johnston, J. M., & Pennypacker, H. S. (1980). Strategies and Tactics of Human Behavioral 
Research. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Kazdin, A. E. (1994). Behavior Modification in Applied Settings (4th ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: 
Brookes/Cole Publishing Company. 
Killimett, P. T. (1991). The identification of critical behaviors: The first step in a behavior-based 
safety process. TAPPI, 74, 251–253. 
Komaki, J. L., Barwick, K. D., & Scott, L. R. (1978). A behavioral approach to occupational 
safety: Pinpointing and reinforcing safe performance in a food manufacturing plant. Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 63, 434–445. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.63.4.434 
Krause, T. R., Seymour, K. J., & Sloat, K. C. M. (1999). Long-term evaluation of a behavior-
based method for improving safety performance: a meta-analysis of 73 interrupted time-
series replications. Safety Science, 32, 1–18. doi: 10.1016/S0925-7535(99)00007-7 
Lebbon, A., Sigurdsson, S. O., & Austin, J. (2012). Behavioral safety in the food services 
industry: Challenges and outcomes. Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 32, 
44–57. doi: 10.1080/01608061.2011.592792 
Lindsley, O. R. (1991). From technical jargon To plain English for application. Journal of 
Applied Behavior Analysis, 24, 449–458. doi: 10.1901/jaba.1991.24-449 
Ludwig, T. D., & Geller, E. S. (1997). Assigned versus participative goal setting and response 
generalization: Managing injury control among professional pizza deliverers. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 82, 253–261. doi: 10.1037/0021-9010.82.2.253 
Mainstone, L. E., & Levi, A. S. (1988). Fundamentals of statistical process control. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior Management, 9, 5–22. doi: 10.1300/J075v09n01_02 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 50 
 
Matey, N., Gravina, N., Rajagopal, S., & Betz, A. (2019). Effects of feedback delivery 
requirements on accuracy of observations. Journal of Organizational Behavior 
Management, 39, 247–256. doi: 10.1080/01608061.2019.1666773 
Mayer, G. R., Sulzer-Azaroff, B., & Wallace, M. (2019). Behavior analysis for lasting change. In 
Behavior analysis for lasting change. (4th ed.). Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.usherbrooke.ca/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=psyh&AN=1992-97850-000&site=ehost-live 
McSween, T. E. (2003). Value-Based Safety Process Improving Your Safety Culture With 
Behavior-Based Safety (2nd ed.). Retrieved from www.copyright.com. 
McSween, T., & Moran, D. J. (2017). Assessing and preventing serious incidents with behavioral 
science: Enhancing heinrich’s triangle for the 21st century. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior Management, 37, 283–300. doi: 10.1080/01608061.2017.1340923 
Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plos or minus two: Some limits on your 
capacity for processing information. The Psychological Review, 63, 81–97. 
Miller, L. K. (2006). Principles of Everyday Behavior Analysis (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth. 
Myers, W. V., McSween, T. E., Medina, R. E., Rost, K., & Alvero, A. M. (2010). The 
implementation and maintenance of a behavioral safety process in a petroleum refinery. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior Management, 30, 285–307. doi: 
10.1080/01608061.2010.499027 
Pfadt, A., & Wheeler, D. J. (1995). Using statistical process control to make data-based clinical 
decisions. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 28, 349–370. doi: 10.1901/jaba.1995.28-
349 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 51 
 
Pransky, G., Snyder, T., Dembe, A., & Himmelstein, J. (1999). Under-reporting of work-related 
disorders in the workplace: A case study and review of the literature. Ergonomics, 42, 171–
182. doi: 10.1080/001401399185874 
Reber, R. A., & Wallin, J. A. (1984). The effects of training, goal setting, and knowledge of 
results on safe behavior: A component analysis. The Academy of Management Journal, 27, 
544–560. 
Sulzer-Azaroff, B., & Austin, J. A. (2000). Does BBS work. Professional Safety, 19–24. 
Sulzer-Azaroff, B., & De Santamaria, M. C. (1980). Industrial safety hazard reduction through 
performance feedback. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 13, 287–295. doi: 
10.1901/jaba.1980.13-287 
Sulzer-Azaroff, B., & Fellner, D. J. (1984). Searching for performance targets in the behavioral 
analysis of occupational health and safety: An assessment strategy. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior Management, 6, 53–65. doi: 10.1300/J075v06n02_09 
Sulzer-Azaroff, B., Loafman, B., Merante, R. J., & Hlavacek, A. C. (1990). Journal of 
organizational behavior improving occupational safety in a large industrial plant. Journal of 
Organizational Behavior Management, 11, 99–120. doi: 10.1300/J075v11n01_07 
White, O. R. (1971). A glossary of behavioral terminology. doi: 
10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Wilder, D. A., Lipschultz, J. L., King, A., Driscoll, S., & Sigurdsson, S. (2018). An analysis of 
the commonality and type of preintervention assessment procedures in the journal of 
organizational behavior management (2000-2015). Journal of Organizational Behavior 
Management, 38, 1–13. doi: 10.1080/01608061.2017.1325822 
Wirth, O., & Sigurdsson, S. O. (2008). When workplace safety depends on behavior change: 
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 52 
 
Topics for behavioral safety research. Journal of Safety Research, 39, 589–598. doi: 
10.1016/j.jsr.2008.10.005 
 
  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 53 
 
Tables 
Table 1 
The Number of Weeks each Department Spent in each Experimental Phase 
 Total Baseline Pinpointing New Checklist 
Implemented 
Department A 67 1 (Managers) 23 
Department B 72 2 (Managers) 17 
Department C 78 2 (Employees) 11 
Department D 88   
Department E 88   
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Table 2 
Baseline Checklist Pinpoint Ratings Across Raters 
Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
A 
(Management) 
Correct PPE noted by 
Operations on SWP? 
0 4 2 1 2 4 2.17 (1.60) 
 Correct PPE worn by 
Craftspeople? 
1 4 2 3 4 3 2.83 (1.17) 
 Is material free of burrs? 1 3 2 0 2 2 1.67 (1.03) 
 Is local exhaust being used 
during welding? 
6 4 3 2 4 5 4.00 (1.41) 
 Is LEV as close as possible 
to the welding? 
1 3 2 1 6 0 2.17 (2.14) 
 Is correct respiratory 
equipment used according to 
the chemical hazards 
present? 
3 4 2 1 4 4 3.00 (1.26) 
 Is the body positioned to 
avoid sparks & U.V. light? 
3 5 3 3 5 4 3.83 (0.98) 
 Is the work grounded? 1 2 2 0 1 0 1.00 (0.89) 
 What could destabilize 
object? What direction will 
gravity take object? 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0.17 (0.41) 
 Where is the stored energy? 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.33 (0.52) 
 Where are the pinch points 
with this machine/equip.? 
0 0 0 0 3 1 0.67 (1.21) 
 Tool used (instead of body) 
to stabilize / hold object? 
6 5 2 1 5 4 3.83 (1.94) 
 Object is secured / Sling 
holding object is secured? 
2 5 2 0 4 1 2.33 (1.86) 
 Object is attached to correct 
positioner? 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2.00 (0.00) 
 How can plate clamps lead to 
injury or damage? 
0 1 0 0 2 1 0.67 (0.82) 
 What are the critical lift 
requirements? 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0.17 (0.41) 
 What parts of equip. did you 
inspect before lifting? 
0 3 1 2 3 3 2.00 (1.26) 
 What was pedestrian control 
plan for clear path? 
0 0 0 0 3 0 0.50 (1.22) 
 During lifting, what damage 
could occur to chockers, 
body parts, equipment? 
0 1 1 1 4 4 1.83 (1.72) 
 Slow pivoting / turning? 4 4 2 0 3 0 2.17 (1.83) 
 Used 3-points of contact? 5 4 2 2 4 3 3.33 (1.21) 
 Tested footing before 
committing weight when 
stepping? 
6 5 5 6 5 4 5.17 (0.75) 
 Fall protection is being used? 5 4 2 1 4 4 3.33 (1.51) 
 Harness is worn correctly? 1 4 2 1 3 3 2.33 (1.21) 
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Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
 Scaffolding built correctly so 
craftspeople can reach 
equip.? 
2 4 3 3 5 4 3.50 (1.05) 
 Fixtures / equipment used to 
hold things? 
2 2 1 0 3 2 1.67 (1.03) 
 When retrieving 
items/pulling equip., load 
<1ft from chest? 
6 6 6 6 6 5 5.83 (0.41) 
 When lifting, load is 
close/against body 
6 5 3 5 5 5 4.83 (0.98) 
 Floor has good traction (no 
grease, water, ice, oils, etc.)? 
0 3 2 0 2 1 1.33 (1.21) 
 Station is clear of hoses, 
power cords, scrap 
materials? 
3 2 2 1 3 2 2.17 (0.75) 
B (Manager) Truck, pump, and hoses 
inspected daily? 
6 5 2 2 6 5 4.33 (1.86) 
 JSR: Jointly identified 
equipment in field with 
Operations? 
0 3 0 1 3 4 1.83 (1.72) 
 Know location Zone, EAP, 
TH, closest escape route? 
0 3 0 1 4 2 1.67 (1.63) 
 Know location of closest 
safety shower/eyewash 
station? 
1 3 0 0 4 3 1.83 (1.72) 
 Is there an approved tie off 
point? 
1 2 1 0 2 0 1.00 (0.89) 
 Safe Work/Hot Work filled 
out completely by 
Operations? 
4 4 1 1 4 4 3.00 (1.55) 
 Correct PPE noted by 
Operations? 
0 4 2 2 2 4 2.33 (1.51) 
 Correct PPE worn by 
Mechanics? 
4 4 2 4 4 2 3.33 (1.03) 
 Rig setup: scan hazards? 3 5 2 1 4 4 3.17 (1.47) 
 Rig leveling: Setting up on 
incline? 
4 3 2 0 5 4 3.00 (1.79) 
 Orange cones set around 
truck 
2 4 2 2 5 2 2.83 (1.33) 
 Wheel chocks used 
correctly? 
6 4 2 0 4 4 3.33 (2.07) 
 Work area identified with 
Blue Hydro tape? Signs? 
1 4 2 2 2 2 2.17 (0.98) 
 Are required drains covered 1 1 1 2 2 2 1.50 (0.55) 
 Where are possible overhead 
drips? 
1 1 0 0 3 0 0.83 (1.17) 
 Railroad tracks: Rig is 10 ft 
off center of tracks? 
1 3 1 2 2 2 1.83 (0.75) 
 Railroad tracks: If rig within 
10 ft, tracks locked out? 
6 5 3 3 3 2 3.67 (1.51) 
 How did today’s weather 
impact equipment 
operations? 
0 0 0 0 1 3 0.67 (1.21) 
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Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
 What could go wrong? What 
would you do then? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
 Confined space walked down 
with Ops./Plant Protection? 
4 4 1 2 6 3 3.33 (1.75) 
 Can confined space be 
entered and exited safely? 
1 3 2 0 3 0 1.50 (1.38) 
 Temperature of vessel? 
What’s temp. to work safely? 
1 1 0 1 3 0 1.00 (1.10) 
 Is body position out of line 
of fire (dropped objects)? 
0 3 2 1 3 1 1.67 (1.21) 
 Slow pivoting / turning? 4 4 2 0 3 0 2.17 (1.83) 
 Used 3-points of contact? 6 2 2 3 4 3 3.33 (1.51) 
 Tested footing before 
committing weight when 
stepping? 
5 5 3 5 5 4 4.50 (0.84) 
 Floor has good traction (no 
grease, water, ice, oils, etc.)? 
1 0 2 1 2 2 1.33 (0.82) 
 Tripping Hazards (hoses 
walkways, pipe, wood, skids) 
1 2 2 0 2 0 1.17 (0.98) 
 Correct tool for the task? 0 2 2 0 3 0 1.17 (1.33) 
 Correct HB PPE? Has PPE 
been inspected for wear? 
4 4 2 3 5 4 3.67 (1.03) 
 Can the dump gun operator 
see the lance operator? 
0 4 2 2 4 2 2.33 (1.51) 
 Lighting adequate for the 
task? 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0.67 (0.52) 
 Lance operator/crew 
members out of the line of 
fire? 
2 3 2 0 3 2 2.00 (1.10) 
 Shielding to protect 
pedestrians? 
1 3 0 2 5 3 2.33 (1.75) 
 Hoses & equipt. good 
working condition? 
Inspected? 
5 4 2 0 6 4 3.50 (2.17) 
 Whip checks installed 
correctly? 
1 4 2 0 5 2 2.33 (1.86) 
 Fall protection is required & 
used? 
4 4 2 2 4 4 3.33 (1.03) 
 Harness is worn correctly? 3 5 2 4 3 3 3.33 (1.03) 
 Scaffolding built correctly so 
mechanics can reach equip.? 
4 2 2 1 5 3 2.83 (1.47) 
 Fixtures / equipment used to 
hold things? 
5 4 2 0 3 3 2.83 (1.72) 
 Are they using correct force 
needed for that tool / equip.? 
5 4 2 1 2 2 2.67 (1.51) 
 When retrieving 
items/pulling equip., load 
<1ft from chest? 
6 6 3 6 6 5 5.33 (1.21) 
 When lifting, load is 
close/against body 
6 5 3 5 5 5 4.83 (0.98) 
C (Employee) 1.1 Hand Protection 1 1 2 1 2 0 1.17 (0.75) 
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Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
 1.2 Eye/Face Protection 0 2 2 1 2 0 1.17 (0.98) 
 1.3 Protective Clothing 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.50 (0.84) 
 1.4 Head Protection 0 1 2 1 2 0 1.00 (0.89) 
 1.5 Respiratory Protection 2 0 2 0 0 0 0.67 (1.03) 
 1.6 Hearing Protection 0 2 2 1 2 0 1.17 (0.98) 
 2.1 Eyes on Hands 2 2 2 3 3 4 2.67 (0.82) 
 2.2 Line of Fire / Pinch 
Points 
0 1 2 0 1 0 0.67 (0.82) 
 2.3 Eyes on Path 0 5 2 3 4 1 2.50 (1.87) 
 2.4 Body Position 
(Ergonomics) 
0 2 0 1 2 0 0.83 (0.98) 
 2.5 Hurrying/Rusing 4 3 2 0 1 0 1.67 (1.63) 
 2.6 Lifting 4 4 0 0 3 0 1.83 (2.04) 
 3.1 Tools and Equipment 
Condition 
0 0 0 0 2 1 0.50 (0.84) 
 3.2 Tool and Equipment 
Selection and Use 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0.17 (0.41) 
 3.3 Ventilation 0 0 2 0 0 0 0.33 (0.82) 
 3.4 Glassware 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.33 (0.52) 
 4.1 Communication 0 2 1 0 4 0 1.17 (1.60) 
 4.2 Lock Out / Tag Out 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.17 (0.41) 
 4.3 Permits 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.17 (0.41) 
 4.4 JSA / Test Method / 
Operating Procedures 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
 4.5 Hazard Recognition and 
Control 
0 2 0 0 1 0 0.50 (0.84) 
 4.6 Knows location of 
nearest eyewash and shower 
1 3 0 1 4 3 2.00 (1.55) 
 5.1 Chemical 
Storage/Disposal/Handling 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0.33 (0.52) 
 5.2 Housekeeping 0 0 0 0 3 1 0.67 (1.21) 
 5.3 Physical Condition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
 6.1 Mobile Equipment 0 0 0 0 2 0 0.33 (0.82) 
 6.2 Chemical Labeling 0 3 1 0 1 0 0.83 (1.17) 
 6.3 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
 7.1 Striking Against Objects 5 4 1 0 2 0 2.00 (2.10) 
 7.2 Struck by Objects 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.67 (0.52) 
 7.3 Caught In/On/Between 
Objects 
2 1 2 0 0 2 1.17 (0.98) 
 7.4 Contacting Temperature 
Extremes 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
 7.5 Contacting Electrical 
Current 
1 0 1 0 3 0 0.83 (1.17) 
 7.6 Overexertion 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.17 (0.41) 
 7.7 Repetitive Motions 4 0 2 0 2 0 1.33 (1.63) 
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Note. Table displaying the raters scoring of pinpoint criteria per pinpoint. Pinpoints were rated 
from 0-7 based on the seven pinpointing criterion. Pinpoints receive one point for each of the 
criteria met. 
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Table 3 
Task-specific Checklist Pinpoint Ratings Across Raters 
Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
A 
(Management) 
Jaws / fixtures set 
properly, including the 
safety stops? 
2 4 2 1 5 4 3.00 (1.55) 
 Clamps, t-nuts, etc. in 
good shape? 
1 3 1 0 3 1 1.50 (1.22) 
 Can employee perform this 
function safely without 
assistance? 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0.33 (0.52) 
 Correct tool used for task? 5 3 2 1 3 4 3.00 (1.41) 
 Machine guards in place? 1 3 2 1 3 2 2.00 (0.89) 
 Machine functioning 
properly? 
2 1 1 0 2 0 1.00 (0.89) 
 Using techniques to 
minimize excessive force / 
gripping to manipulate 
tools and equipment? 
7 4 5 1 5 4 4.33 (1.97) 
 Has anything been 
improvised or fixed to 
make due, to get job done? 
0 3 3 0 3 2 1.83 (1.47) 
 Wearing proper PPE when 
needed? 
3 3 2 4 4 4 3.33 (0.82) 
 Chemical concerns? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
 Lifting devices inspected 
prior to use? 
6 5 2 3 6 5 4.50 (1.64) 
 Proper lifting devices 
used? Quick sleeves used? 
4 4 2 2 4 4 3.33 (1.03) 
 Bystanders aware and at a 
safe distance? 
1 1 2 0 3 1 1.33 (1.03) 
 Lifting equipment stored 
properly? 
5 4 2 2 4 3 3.33 (1.21) 
 Burrs or sharp edges 
present? 
1 1 1 1 3 1 1.33 (0.82) 
 Aware of pinch points and 
hand traps? 
0 3 0 0 4 4 1.83 (2.04) 
 Body positioned correctly? 2 3 2 1 3 0 1.83 (1.17) 
 Correct lifting technique? 4 3 2 1 3 2 2.50 (1.05) 
 Repetitive motion? 4 3 1 0 2 0 1.67 (1.63) 
 Any trip / slip hazards? 0 2 2 0 2 1 1.17 (0.98) 
 Work table cluttered? 0 3 2 1 4 1 1.83 (1.47) 
 Equipment / floor free of 
shavings? 
0 2 2 0 2 2 1.33 (1.03) 
 Cutters stored with covers 
in place? 
0 3 2 0 5 4 2.33 (2.07) 
 Decontamination tag 
present & correct? 
1 3 2 1 2 2 1.83 (0.75) 
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Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
 Coolant contaminated? 1 3 1 0 1 0 1.00 (1.10) 
 Floor free of coolant & 
waste oil? 
1 3 2 0 2 0 1.33 (1.21) 
 >1 can of aerosol product 
at work station? 
2 3 2 1 4 0 2.00 (1.41) 
 Chemical concerns? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
B (Manager) Truck, pump, and hoses 
inspected daily? 
6 5 2 2 6 5 4.33 (1.86) 
 Extreme temperature 
precautions taken 
2 3 1 0 3 2 1.83 (1.17) 
 4-man crew 1 0 1 0 1 0 0.50 (0.55) 
 Jointly identified equip in 
field 
5 4 2 1 2 4 3.00 (1.55) 
 Zone, Temporary Haven, 
EAP identified 
1 1 0 0 4 3 1.50 (1.64) 
 Planned escape route 1 2 1 0 2 0 1.00 (0.89) 
 Location & tested shower 
and eye wash 
0 3 0 1 5 4 2.17 (2.14) 
 Area clear of tripping 
hazards, hoses, scrap, 
equip. 
1 2 2 1 2 2 1.67 (0.52) 
 Safe Work Permits filled 
out correctly 
1 4 1 1 5 2 2.33 (1.75) 
 Hot Work Permit filled out 
correctly 
2 5 2 3 3 2 2.83 (1.17) 
 Confined Space Permit fill 
out correctly 
4 4 1 1 5 2 2.83 (1.72) 
 Current temperature of 
equipment 
1 1 1 1 2 0 1.00 (0.63) 
 Blue HP tape around work 
area 
2 3 2 1 2 2 2.00 (0.63) 
 Crescent wrench 
appropriate tool 
0 3 2 0 1 0 1.00 (1.26) 
 Channel-locks appropriate 
tool 
0 2 1 0 2 0 0.83 (0.98) 
 Orange cone marking safe 
work boundary around the 
rig 
1 4 2 1 3 2 2.17 (1.17) 
 Is the Rig level 1 4 2 1 2 2 2.00 (1.10) 
 Blast hose routed away 
from walkway if possible 
2 4 2 2 3 2 2.50 (0.84) 
 Equipment flushed to 
check for debris and blown 
out orifices 
6 5 2 3 6 5 4.50 (1.64) 
 Whip checks used properly 4 4 2 0 4 3 2.83 (1.60) 
 PPE (HB policy followed) 0 4 2 1 2 3 2.00 (1.41) 
 Equipment is inspected 5 4 1 1 4 4 3.17 (1.72) 
 Safety Equipment worn 
correctly 
5 4 2 1 3 3 3.00 (1.41) 
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Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
 What energy is present? 
(Steam, line plugged, head 
pressure) 
0 2 1 0 2 1 1.00 (0.89) 
 Can worker be “out of the 
line of fire” 
1 1 2 0 2 0 1.00 (0.89) 
 Aware of the possibility of 
stored/trapped energy 
0 2 0 0 4 0 1.00 (1.67) 
 Can “Hands Free" 
equipment be used 
0 4 2 0 0 0 1.00 (1.67) 
 "Hands Free" equipment 
set up correctly 
1 4 2 0 4 2 2.17 (1.60) 
 What could go wrong? 
What would you do then? 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 (0.00) 
 Pump Operator on the Rig 2 2 1 1 5 2 2.17 (1.47) 
 Pump Operator wearing 
his headset 
3 4 2 3 4 3 3.17 (0.75) 
 Dump Gun Operator 
Position - Line of sight 
with lance operator 
2 3 2 3 3 2 2.50 (0.55) 
 Lance/hose/fitting/nozzle 
inspection 
5 3 0 0 5 0 2.17 (2.48) 
 Changed operations based 
on weather conditions 
0 4 2 1 2 3 2.00 (1.41) 
 Fall protection is being 
used 
5 3 2 1 4 4 3.17 (1.47) 
 Harness is inspected before 
use? What did you inspect? 
6 5 2 3 5 4 4.17 (1.47) 
 Harness is worn correctly 3 4 2 2 3 2 2.67 (0.82) 
 Used 3 -points of contact 4 2 2 3 4 3 3.00 (0.89) 
 Scaffolding built correctly 
to reach equip 
1 2 2 3 5 4 2.83 (1.47) 
 Using personnel lift to 
perform task? (JLG) 2 
trained lift operators? 
4 3 2 1 4 3 2.83 (1.17) 
 Flange and pipe ends 
cleaned with rigid lance 
5 5 2 2 6 4 4.00 (1.67) 
 Can backout device make 
job safer 
0 0 0 0 1 2 0.50 (0.84) 
 Stored energy concerns 
addressed 
0 2 1 1 2 2 1.33 (0.82) 
 Proper stinger length per 
diameter of pipe 
0 3 1 1 4 1 1.67 (1.51) 
 Hose crimp and nozzle 
length equal to ID of pipe? 
1 4 1 2 2 2 2.00 (1.10) 
 Hydraulic concerns 
addressed - can lance 
machine be used? 
0 4 1 0 4 0 1.50 (1.97) 
 End of tubes cleaned with 
rigid lance 
5 4 2 1 6 4 3.67 (1.86) 
 Correct diameter lance 
used 
5 4 2 2 3 2 3.00 (1.26) 
 Proper stinger is used 5 4 2 1 4 4 3.33 (1.51) 
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Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
 Foot shield and shin guards 
used properly 
5 4 2 1 3 4 3.17 (1.47) 
 Overhead obstruction 
identified 
4 2 2 1 4 1 2.33 (1.37) 
 Safe lancing technique 
used 
2 4 2 1 4 0 2.17 (1.60) 
 Safe distance from nozzle 
(2 feet) 
2 4 2 3 5 2 3.00 (1.26) 
 Both hands on lance 3 4 2 4 5 4 3.67 (1.03) 
 Safe lancing technique 
used 
4 4 2 1 4 2 2.83 (1.33) 
 Correct size collet installed 0 4 1 1 4 4 2.33 (1.86) 
 Control Box in safe 
location 
1 3 0 0 2 2 1.33 (1.21) 
 Hose stop installed 1 4 2 1 4 2 2.33 (1.37) 
 Wearing PPE 10 ft of 
equip being cleaned 
6 5 3 5 5 2 4.33 (1.51) 
C (Employee) Started loosening back 
bolts first while taking off 
flange? 
6 6 4 4 5 5 5.00 (0.89) 
 If valve opening needed to 
be cleaned, operator did so 
without being in direct 
path? (e.g., arm fully 
extended, body to the side, 
face away from opening) 
6 7 6 7 6 6 6.33 (0.52) 
 Ground operator 
communicated to nitrogen 
operator that all valves are 
set in the line 
(opened/closed)? 
5 5 5 5 6 4 5.00 (0.63) 
 Correct tool used for task? 
(instead of using body or 
an improvised tool; like a 
screwdriver to rip off a tag 
or channel locks to loosen 
bolts) 
5 3 2 2 4 4 3.33 (1.21) 
 Started loosening back 
bolts first while taking off 
flange? 
6 5 6 4 5 5 5.17 (0.75) 
 Put on (PPE) prior to 
touching bolts with hand? 
6 6 5 6 6 5 5.67 (0.52) 
 If bolt is too hot, took 
break to avoid heat? 
7 5 4 3 7 6 5.33 (1.63) 
 Set up air horn prior to 
opening sample valve? 
6 5 6 4 5 5 5.17 (0.75) 
 Opened sample collector 
without being in direct 
path of opening? (e.g., arm 
fully extended, body to the 
side, face away from 
opening) 
6 5 4 6 6 5 5.33 (0.82) 
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Department Pinpoint Rater 
1 
Rater 
2 
Rater 
3 
Rater 
4 
Rater 
5 
Rater 
6 
M (SD) 
 Operator was in control of 
sample valve opening? 
(e.g., opened at a slow 
pace) 
6 4 2 5 4 3 4.00 (1.41) 
 (Valve Operator) Stood on 
side of valve opening? 
4 4 2 1 5 4 3.33 (1.51) 
 Operator used engineered 
tool to rod dumpster? 
5 3 3 3 4 4 3.67 (0.82) 
 Pushed rod into dumpster 
while standing to side? 
(not directly behind) 
5 4 6 5 5 4 4.83 (0.75) 
 If required excessive force, 
were appropriate measures 
taken to mitigate force? 
(asking for help, taking a 
break, tool selection, etc.) 
7 5 7 2 7 4 5.33 (2.07) 
 Put venting hose over 
valve opening prior to 
venting pressure? 
6 6 6 4 6 5 5.50 (0.84) 
 Used three points of 
contact while using foot to 
lift turn valve? Arms must 
be extended to opposite 
locations. 
7 6 7 6 6 6 6.33 (0.52) 
Note. Table displaying the raters scoring of pinpoint criteria per pinpoint. Pinpoints were rated 
from 0-7 based on the seven pinpointing criterion. Pinpoints receive one point for each of the 
criteria met. 
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Table 4 
Pinpoint Criteria Mean and Standard Deviation by Checklist 
Department Baseline  Task-specific 
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
A 2.36 (1.85)  1.96 (1.61) 
B 2.45 (1.74)  2.31 (1.62) 
C 0.84 (1.20)  4.96 (1.34) 
Note. Mean and standard deviation were calculated with all six raters pinpointing scores across 
all pinpoints for each checklist.  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 65 
 
Table 5 
Pinpoint Categorization into prior Baseline Behavior Categories 
Behavior Categories Task-Specific Pinpoint Department 
Personal Protective 
Equipment 
Wearing proper PPE when needed? A 
Fall protection is being used B 
Foot shield and shin guards used properly B 
Harness is worn correctly B 
PPE (HB policy followed) B 
Wearing PPE 10 ft of equip being cleaned B 
Put on (PPE) prior to touching bolts with hand? C 
   
Body Use Aware of pinch points and hand traps? A 
Burrs or sharp edges present? A 
Body positioned correctly? A 
Correct lifting technique? A 
Both hands on lance B 
Safe distance from nozzle (2 feet) B 
Safe lancing technique used B 
Safe lancing technique used B 
Used 3 -points of contact B 
(Valve Operator) Stood on side of valve opening? C 
If valve opening needed to be cleaned, operator 
did so without being in direct path? (e.g., arm 
fully extended, body to the side, face away from 
opening) 
C 
Opened sample collector without being in direct 
path of opening? (e.g., arm fully extended, body 
to the side, face away from opening) 
C 
Pushed rod into dumpster while standing to side? 
(not directly behind) 
C 
Started loosening back bolts first while taking off 
flange? 
C 
Used three points of contact while using foot to 
lift turn valve? Arms must be extended to opposite 
locations. 
C 
Operator was in control of sample valve opening? 
(e.g., opened at a slow pace) 
C 
   
Tools & Equipment Clamps, t-nuts, etc. in good shape? A 
Has anything been improvised or fixed to make 
due, to get job done? 
A 
Jaws / fixtures set properly, including the safety 
stops? 
A 
Lifting equipment stored properly? A 
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Behavior Categories Task-Specific Pinpoint Department 
Machine functioning properly? A 
Machine guards in place? A 
Correct tool used for task? A 
Lifting devices inspected prior to use? A 
Proper lifting devices used? Quick sleeves used? A 
End of tubes cleaned with rigid lance B 
Equipment flushed to check for debris and blown 
out orifices 
B 
Equipment is inspected B 
Flange and pipe ends cleaned with rigid lance B 
Harness is inspected before use? What did you 
inspect? 
B 
Is the Rig level B 
Lance/hose/fitting/nozzle inspection B 
Safety Equipment worn correctly B 
Truck, pump, and hoses inspected daily? B 
"Hands Free" equipment set up correctly B 
Can “Hands Free" equipment be used B 
Can backout device make job safer B 
Channel-locks appropriate tool B 
Correct diameter lance used B 
Correct size collet installed B 
Crescent wrench appropriate tool B 
Hose crimp and nozzle length equal to ID of pipe? B 
Hose stop installed B 
Proper stinger is used B 
Proper stinger length per diameter of pipe B 
Pump Operator wearing his headset B 
Whip checks used properly B 
Correct tool used for task? (instead of using body 
or an improvised tool; like a screwdriver to rip off 
a tag or channel locks to loosen bolts) 
C 
Operator used engineered tool to rod dumpster? C 
Put venting hose over valve opening prior to 
venting pressure? 
C 
Set up air horn prior to opening sample valve? C 
   
Policies and 
Procedures 
Bystanders aware and at a safe distance? A 
Can employee perform this function safely 
without assistance? 
A 
Dump Gun Operator Position - Line of sight with 
lance operator 
B 
Pump Operator on the Rig B 
Confined Space Permit fill out correctly B 
Current temperature of equipment B 
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Behavior Categories Task-Specific Pinpoint Department 
Hot Work Permit filled out correctly B 
Safe Work Permits filled out correctly B 
Blue HP tape around work area B 
Control Box in safe location B 
Using personnel lift to perform task? (JLG) 2 
trained lift operators? 
B 
Aware of the possibility of stored/trapped energy B 
Can worker be “out of the line of fire” B 
Changed operations based on weather conditions B 
Hydraulic concerns addressed - can lance machine 
be used? 
B 
Jointly identified equip in field B 
Overhead obstruction identified B 
Stored energy concerns addressed B 
What could go wrong? What would you do then? B 
What energy is present? (Steam, line plugged, 
head pressure) 
B 
Location & tested shower and eye wash B 
Planned escape route B 
Zone, Temporary Haven, EAP identified B 
Ground operator communicated to nitrogen 
operator that all valves are set in the line 
(opened/closed)? 
C 
   
Environment and 
Housekeeping 
>1 can of aerosol product at work station? A 
Chemical concerns? A 
Coolant contaminated? A 
Decontamination tag present & correct? A 
Floor free of coolant & waste oil? A 
Any trip / slip hazards? A 
Cutters stored with covers in place? A 
Equipment / floor free of shavings? A 
Work table cluttered? A 
 Area clear of tripping hazards, hoses, scrap, equip. B 
 Blast hose routed away from walkway if possible B 
 Scaffolding built correctly to reach equip B 
   
Positioning of 
People 
Using techniques to minimize excessive force / 
gripping to manipulate tools and equipment? 
A 
Repetitive motion? A 
Extreme temperature precautions taken B 
If bolt is too hot, took break to avoid heat? C 
If required excessive force, were appropriate 
measures taken to mitigate force? (asking for help, 
taking a break, tool selection, etc.) 
C 
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Table 6 
Pinpoint Categorization of Control Departments’ Checklist Items 
Behavior 
Categories 
Pinpoint Department 
PPE Hand Protection D & E 
Eye/Face Protection D & E 
Protective Clothing D & E 
Head Protection D & E 
Respiratory Protection D & E 
Hearing Protection D & E 
   
Body Use Eyes on Hands D & E 
Line of Fire / Pinch Points D & E 
Eyes on Path D & E 
Body Position (Ergonomics) D & E 
Hurrying/Rusing D & E 
Lifting D & E 
   
Tools and 
Equipment 
Tools and Equipment Condition D & E 
Tool and Equipment Selection and Use D & E 
Ventilation D & E 
Glassware D & E 
   
Policies and 
Procedures 
Communication D & E 
Lock Out / Tag Out D & E 
Permits D & E 
JSA / Test Method / Operating Procedures D & E 
Hazard Recognition and Control D & E 
Knows location of nearest eyewash and shower D & E 
   
Environment and 
Housekeeping 
Chemical Storage/Disposal/Handling D & E 
Housekeeping D & E 
Physical Condition D & E 
   
Positioning of 
People 
Striking Against Objects D & E 
Struck by Objects D & E 
Caught In/On/Between Objects D & E 
Contacting Temperature Extremes D & E 
Contacting Electrical Current D & E 
 Overexertion D & E 
 Repetitive Motions D & E 
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Table 7 
Number of Pinpoints Within Each Categorization by Department 
Behavior Categories Department Pinpoints 
PPE A 1 (3%) 
 B 5 (8%) 
 C 1 (6%) 
   
Body Use A 4 (15%) 
 B 5 (8%) 
 C 7 (46%) 
   
Tools and Equipment A 9 (34%) 
 B 22 (38%) 
 C 4 (26%) 
   
Policies and Procedures A 2 (7%) 
 B 21 (36%) 
 C 1 (6%) 
   
Environment and 
Housekeeping 
A 9 (34%) 
 B 3 (20%) 
 C 0 
   
Positioning of People A 1 (3%) 
 B 1 (1%) 
 C 2 (13%) 
Note. The percentage of pinpoints per category out of the total checklist pinpoints appears in 
parentheses.  
  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 70 
 
Table 8 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Pinpoints Mean Risk Identification Percentage Across 
Baseline and Intervention 
Department Baseline Upper Control 
Limit 
Task-specific Upper Control 
Limit 
A (Manager) 1.7 (4.1) 14.2 0.0 (0.0) 14.2 
B (Manager) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 3.5 (8.3) 28.4 
C (Employee) 0.2 (0.5) 1.8 0.0 (0.0) 1.8 
D (Control) 0.1 (0.2) 1.0   
E (Control) 0.2 (0.4) 1.5   
Note. Risk identification is calculated by the total number of at-risk behavior observed divided 
by the sum of the safe and at-risk behavior responses multiplied by 100 for a percentage. The 
standard deviation appears in parentheses. The upper control limit is a calculation of three 
standard deviations. 
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Table 9 
Body Use Pinpoints Mean Risk Identification Percentage Across Baseline and Intervention 
Department Baseline Upper Control 
Limit 
Task-specific Upper Control 
Limit 
A (Manager) 0.6 (1.6) 5.5 0.1 (0.5) 5.5 
B (Manager) 0.3 (1.5) 4.9 0.0 (0.0) 4.9 
C (Employee) 0.5 (1.1) 3.7 9.6 (14.1) 51.9 
D (Control) 0.1 (0.3) 1.0   
E (Control) 0.2 (0.6) 2.0   
Note. Risk identification is calculated by the total number of at-risk behavior observed divided 
by the sum of the safe and at-risk behavior responses multiplied by 100 for a percentage. The 
standard deviation appears in parentheses. The upper control limit is a calculation of three 
standard deviations. 
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Table 10 
Tools and Equipment Pinpoints Mean Risk Identification Percentage Across Baseline and 
Intervention 
Department Baseline Upper Control 
Limit 
Task-specific Upper Control 
Limit 
A (Manager) 2.0 (3.6) 12.8 0.3 (0.7) 12.8 
B (Manager) 0.5 (2.1) 6.8 18.2 (16.0) 66.3 
C (Employee) 0.5 (1.4) 4.6 20.3 (20.7) 82.4 
D (Control) 0.2 (2.1) 6.6   
E (Control) 0.2 (0.8) 2.7   
Note. Risk identification is calculated by the total number of at-risk behavior observed divided 
by the sum of the safe and at-risk behavior responses multiplied by 100 for a percentage. The 
standard deviation appears in parentheses. The upper control limit is a calculation of three 
standard deviations.  
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Table 11 
Policies and Procedures Pinpoints Mean Risk Identification Percentage Across Baseline and 
Intervention 
Department Baseline Upper Control 
Limit 
Task-specific Upper Control 
Limit 
A (Manager) 0.7 (1.9) 6.2 0.3 (1.3) 6.2 
B (Manager) 0.6 (2.0) 6.6 6.9 (5.7) 24.1 
C (Employee) 0.6 (1.1) 3.9 0.0 (0.0) 3.9 
D (Control) 0.1 (0.5) 1.7   
E (Control) 0.4 (0.8) 2.8   
Note. Risk identification is calculated by the total number of at-risk behavior observed divided 
by the sum of the safe and at-risk behavior responses multiplied by 100 for a percentage. The 
standard deviation appears in parentheses. The upper control limit is a calculation of three 
standard deviations. 
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Table 12 
Environment and Housekeeping Pinpoints Mean Risk Identification Percentage Across Baseline 
and Intervention 
Department Baseline Upper Control 
Limit 
Task-specific Upper Control 
Limit 
A (Manager) 3.4 (4.8) 17.7 0.9 (2.4) 17.7 
B (Manager) 1.7 (4.1) 14.1 0.0 (0.0) 14.1 
C (Employee) 0.4 (1.0) 1.8   
D (Control) 0.6 (1.5) 5.0   
E (Control) 1.6 (3.8) 12.8   
Note. Risk identification is calculated by the total number of at-risk behavior observed divided 
by the sum of the safe and at-risk behavior responses multiplied by 100 for a percentage. The 
standard deviation appears in parentheses. The upper control limit is a calculation of three 
standard deviations. Department C did not have any pinpoints in the environment and 
housekeeping category during intervention. 
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Table 13 
Positioning of People Pinpoints Mean Risk Identification Percentage Across Baseline and 
Intervention 
Department Baseline Upper Control 
Limit 
Task-specific Upper Control 
Limit 
A (Manager) 0.9 (4.4) 14.2 0.0 (0.0) 14.2 
B (Manager) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 
C (Employee) 0.3 (0.7) 2.5 0.0 (0.0) 2.5 
D (Control) 0.1 (0.4) 1.1   
E (Control) 0.2 (0.6) 1.9   
Note. Risk identification is calculated by the total number of at-risk behavior observed divided 
by the sum of the safe and at-risk behavior responses multiplied by 100 for a percentage. The 
standard deviation appears in parentheses. The upper control limit is a calculation of three 
standard deviations. 
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Table 14 
Rate of Action Items Created and By Source 
Department Baseline  Task-specific 
 Observation  Other Source  Observation Other Source 
A 0.0 8.7  0.0 2.3 
B 0.0 7.0  0.0 3.9 
C 0.0 0.1  1.8 0.00 
D 0.0 0.5    
E 0.0 0.2    
Note: When employees requested a safety action item on their behavioral checklist, these action 
items are listed under observation source. Other source includes action items that are created 
from injuries, audits, and equipment failures. Rates were calculated by taking the total number of 
action items, divided by the total number of weeks. 
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Table 15 
Injuries by Phase and Department  
Department Baseline  Task-specific 
 Injuries  Injuries 
A 12 injuries over 67 weeks  2 injuries over 22 weeks 
B 29 injuries over 72 weeks  1 injury over 16 weeks 
C 3 injuries over 78 weeks  0 injuries over 11 weeks 
D 4 injuries 90 over weeks   
E 7 injuries 90 over weeks   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Occupational injuries per 100 employees (OSHA recordable) compared to annual 
number of fatalities in the United States. Filled circles represent the annual OSHA rate in the 
United States. Open circles represent the annual number of fatalities in the United States (USLD, 
BLS, 2018). 
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Figure 2. Distribution of average rater pinpoint criterion scores for each Department. Filled bars 
represent ratings of pinpoints appearing in baseline checklists. Clear bars represent ratings of 
pinpoints appearing in the new task-specific checklist.  
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Figure 3. Weekly aggregate of percentage of PPE categorized risk pinpoints identified per 
department. Solid line indicates the mean percentage risk during baseline. Dashed horizontal 
lines indicate three sigma units during each departments baseline. Shaded area indicates three 
sigma units above and below the mean. Vertical dashed line indicates phase change from baseline 
to task-specific checklist.  
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Figure 4. Weekly aggregate of percentage of Body Use categorized risk pinpoints identified per 
department. Solid line indicates the mean percentage risk during baseline. Dashed horizontal 
lines indicate three sigma units during each departments baseline. Shaded area indicates three 
sigma units above and below the mean. Vertical dashed line indicates phase change from baseline 
to task-specific checklist.
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Figure 5. Weekly aggregate of percentage of tools and equipment categorized risk pinpoints 
identified per department. Solid line indicates the mean percentage risk during baseline. Dashed 
horizontal lines indicate three sigma units during each departments baseline. Shaded area 
indicates three sigma units above and below the mean. Vertical dashed line indicates phase 
change from baseline to task-specific checklist.  
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Figure 6. Weekly aggregate of percentage of policies and procedures categorized risk pinpoints 
identified per department. Solid line indicates the mean percentage risk during baseline. Dashed 
horizontal lines indicate three sigma units during each departments baseline. Shaded area 
indicates three sigma units above and below the mean. Vertical dashed line indicates phase 
change from baseline to task-specific checklist. 
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Figure 7. Weekly aggregate of percentage of environment and housekeeping categorized risk 
pinpoints identified per department. Solid line indicates the mean percentage risk during 
baseline. Dashed horizontal lines indicate three sigma units during each departments baseline. 
Shaded area indicates three sigma units above and below the mean. Vertical dashed line indicates 
phase change from baseline to task-specific checklist. 
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Figure 8. Weekly aggregate of percentage of positioning of people categorized risk pinpoints 
identified per department. Solid line indicates the mean percentage risk during baseline. Dashed 
horizontal lines indicate three sigma units during each departments baseline. Shaded area 
indicates three sigma units above and below the mean. Vertical dashed line indicates phase 
change from baseline to task-specific checklist.  
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Figure 9. Cumulative action items created for all departments. The y axis measures the total 
number of action items created since the start of the study. The x axis displays consecutive 
weeks. Each action item created, increases the data on the y axis. A steeper slope indicates a 
greater rate of action items being created, whereas a gradual slope represented a lesser rate. 
Filled circles indicate the number action items created from injuries, audits, and equipment 
failures. Open circles represent action items that resulted from behavioral observations.  
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Appendix A 
Data and Materials Distribution Agreement 
 
  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 88 
 
 
  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 89 
 
 
  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 90 
 
 
  
IDENTIFICATION OF AT-RISK BEHAVIOR 91 
 
Appendix B 
IRB Approval Letter
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Appendix C 
Focus Group Meeting Protocol 
Description: This meeting will last approximately 45-60 minutes, the agenda of the 
meeting can be found below. 
 State that the purpose of this meeting is to identify critical behaviors that are seen as 
most important to have conversations around in the field, intervene if something doesn’t 
look okay for the development of the new observation checklist.  
o If talking to workers, also discuss how the tool can be used to gather data around 
the barriers to their job so they can be removed by leadership. 
 Questions that will be asked to facilitate discussion are: 
o What are tasks that you worry about with new employees? 
o What are tasks that are routine and boring but may have a hazard associate with 
it? 
o What tasks require a lot of experience to learn? 
o What task are infrequent but complicated? How do you keep yourself safe? 
o When work gets busy – crazy stressful – what does that look like? What tasks are 
involved in that? 
o What tasks involve excessive force to perform the task? 
o What tasks put your body parts at risk of pinch points and sharp edges? 
 The following questions will be used as follow ups to inquire further. 
o Where is it likely to go wrong / steps forgotten with all those tasks? 
o Are there issues with tool selection? Tool availability? 
o When do people get most confused with the type of PPE to wear? 
o What PPE is the most uncomfortable? 
o What PPE would you want to see on here, the most critical? 
 The manager/workers will then be asked to rate them in terms of critical to safety.  
 The manager/workers will then be asked how often they perform these behaviors? 
 Tell the crew/managers that the critical tasks and behaviors discussed will be compared 
with the data for selection of items on the observation checklist 
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Appendix D 
Checklist Development Tool 
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Appendix E 
Pinpoint Criterion Training 
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Appendix F 
Example of Pinpointing Criterion Checklist 
Question 
Tells you 
the bodily 
(or verbal) 
action that 
should 
happen? 
(Action) 
Tells you the 
physical thing 
in the 
environment 
that the 
behavior is 
impacting?  
Tells you 
when the 
behavior 
should 
occur? 
Tells you 
what the 
behavior 
will 
achieve? 
Observable 
& 
Measurable? 
In the 
employees 
control? 
Dead 
Person 
Test? (1 
equals 
passed) 
#1        
#2        
#3        
#4        
#5        
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Appendix G 
Example of Observation Checklist Computer Interface 
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Appendix H 
Example of Action Item Creation from Behavioral Observation 
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